

SA Reconciliation Barometer 2019

SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER SURVEY: 2019 REPORT



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SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER SURVEY 2019 REPORT

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
CRPD	Centre for Research on Peace and Development
DA	Democratic Alliance
EFF	Economic Freedom Fighters
FF+	Freedom Front Plus
FTSE	Financial Times Stock Exchange
GDP	gross domestic product
GPI	Global Peace Index
HSRC	Human Sciences Research Council
IEC	Electoral Commission of South Africa
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
LCS	Living Conditions Survey
LPI	Lived Poverty Index
LSM	Living Standard Measure
MTBPS	mid-term budget policy statement
NDP	National Development Plan
NPA	National Prosecuting Authority
NPC	National Planning Commission
PMG	Parliamentary Monitoring Group
SAA	South African Airways
SAARF	South African Audience Research Foundation
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SAHO	South African History Online
SANEF	South African National Editors Forum
SAPS	South African Police Service
SARB	South African Reconciliation Barometer
SARS	South African Revenue Service
SEM	Socio-Economic Measure
StatsSA	Statistics South Africa
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UBPL	upper-bound poverty line
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VBS	Venda Building Society Mutual Bank

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In early November 2019, South Africa won the World Cup Rugby Tournament for the third time since 1995. At a time of growing economic insecurity and social polarisation, the importance of the victory in Yokohama, Japan, reached beyond the sporting achievement, with some drawing parallels between its significance and that of 1995, when the country celebrated its first major sporting victory since the end of apartheid. In subsequent years, many have reflected upon this victory with cynicism, arguing that it filled the country with 'rainbowist' naiveté about the real challenges involved in building a new inclusive and reconciled post-apartheid society. And yet, at the end of 2019 many were asking the same questions about the impact of the victory of a more inclusive team, who approached their campaign under the Twitter hashtag #StrongerTogether. Are we falling prey again to the same naiveté, or is there is still hope and a desire for an inclusive and reconciled South Africa? The South African Reconciliation Barometer have been probing these questions since 2003, and this report provides the results of the most recent round of the survey, which was conducted from July to August 2019.

The results present a mixed picture. The 2019 South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) shows that a vast majority of South Africans agree that South Africa still needs reconciliation, although only about half report that they have experienced reconciliation or believe that South Africa has made progress with reconciliation. Most South Africans agree that reconciliation is impossible as long as: corruption continues in our country; political parties sow division; those who were affected by apartheid continue to be poor; gender-based violence continues in our country; we continue to use racial categories to measure transformation; and racism remains unaddressed in our society. Most South Africans also report that the involvement of various stakeholders is important for reconciliation, in particular their and their families' and friend's involvement, while many understand that responsibility for reconciliation lies both with those who were oppressed and who were not oppressed during apartheid. This shows that there are many aspects of society that can be improved on in the eyes of ordinary South Africans in order to support the reconciliation process, with the involvement of various stakeholders being harnessed. Perhaps these can be seen to present different entry points in contributing to reconciliation processes.

During 2019, national elections were held, with only 66% of registered voters turning up to vote. Voter support for the incumbent African National Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA) as the official opposition decreased, with some smaller parties gaining support during these elections. The SARB's findings show concerningly low political and voting efficacy, with, in particular, concerns regarding the perceived responsiveness of elected representatives. While many South Africans adhere to populist beliefs, most still do agree that the Constitution should be upheld and respected, and, in general, support the rule of law. However, sentiments regarding a lack of consequences for corrupt government officials and ineffectiveness of government to curb corruption further paint a picture of limited confidence in elected representatives and government officials. This is also reflected in the decrease in confidence in key state institutions from 2006 to 2019, although with some increase in confidence from 2017 to 2019 – most notably in the President, with former President

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CONTINUED

Zuma in this position in 2017 and, currently, President Ramaphosa in the position. These findings highlight the need for responsive, transparent and accountable political leadership as an essential part of democratic political culture.

A vast majority of South Africans are proud to be South African and associate positively with national symbols such as the current South African flag. Most South Africans also want unity and think it is possible – with this year showing the greatest optimism in this regard since the inception of the SARB. These findings bode well for building cohesion among South Africans. However, challenges to these hopes persist in the form of historical confrontation – such as with regard to whether or not the old South African flag should be banned – and pervasive sources of division such as inequality and differences between people from different race groups and political parties. It should also be kept in mind that support for a national identity should not again be to the exclusion of ‘others’, with negative attitudes towards people from other countries living in South Africa presenting its own challenges.

Processes such as creating unity and bringing about reconciliation require that a society also understand and remember its divided past in order to create a different future. It is also important that South Africans experience positive change from the country’s divided past to a more united future that so many South Africans agree they want. The 2019 SARB shows that most South Africans acknowledge both the violations of rights under apartheid and the persistent legacies of apartheid today. However, among white respondents – those who were not oppressed under apartheid – the extent of acknowledgement in this regard was less than among other historically defined race groups, begging the question whether enough has been done to incorporate memory into public and private reconciliation initiatives.

The degree of access to tangible and intangible social goods impacts on social cohesion and reconciliation processes. The 2019 SARB shows that – as can be expected from Statistics South Africa’s (StatsSA) findings regarding poverty – female respondents reported greater lived poverty in comparison with male respondents, black African respondents reported greater lived poverty in comparison with other historically defined race groups, and those living in non-metro areas reported greater lived poverty in comparison with metro respondents. In terms of social mobility – equality of opportunities – the 2019 SARB data shows that most South Africans report having the self-confidence and self-determination to realise their personal goals. However, many reported not having access to the financial resources, social capital, education and transport they needed to achieve their personal goals. About a third of South Africans reported intergenerational mobility in terms of household living conditions and/or financial circumstances, while about four in ten South Africans remain optimistic that these circumstances will improve in the near future. At the same time, 48% of South Africans are dissatisfied with their self-perceived economic power, and 44% of South Africans are dissatisfied with their self-perceived political power – indicating a sense of disempowerment for almost half of the South African population.

The 2019 SARB shows greater bonding trust than bridging trust among South Africans, with, in particular, low levels of trust among people from other countries living in South Africa. Xenophobic sentiments are pervasive, with roughly four in ten South Africans agreeing that they are likely to prevent people from other African countries from accessing certain services and from participating in certain activities. Debunking myths that xenophobic attitudes are present primarily among poor people and those with limited formal education, further investigation of the SARB’s data shows a greater extent of xenophobic sentiment among educated groups in comparison with groups with limited formal education, and a greater extent of xenophobic attitudes among higher SEM groups in comparison with lower SEM groups. In addition, younger age groups also show a greater extent of xenophobic beliefs in comparison with older age groups.

In terms of racial reconciliation, most South Africans report that they would like to interact more often with people from other race groups, but for many people language and confidence barriers, as well as negative prior experiences, represent obstacles to doing so. The spaces with the greatest reported racial interaction are places of work or study, while such interaction is least likely to occur in private homes.

A VAST MAJORITY OF SOUTH AFRICANS ARE PROUD TO BE SOUTH AFRICAN AND ASSOCIATE POSITIVELY WITH NATIONAL SYMBOLS SUCH AS THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN FLAG. MOST SOUTH AFRICANS ALSO WANT UNITY AND THINK IT IS POSSIBLE – WITH THIS YEAR SHOWING THE GREATEST OPTIMISM IN THIS REGARD SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE SARB.

Perceptions of safety and violence also impact on the way in which South Africans interact with each other. Crime, coupled with limited capacity to prosecute perpetrators, has implications for citizens and their lived and perceived levels of safety – affecting the fibre of South African society. Feeling safe or unsafe may also relate to socio-economic and power dynamics in society – impacting both reconciliation and social-cohesion processes. It is thus not surprising that many South Africans associated reconciliation with peace as the absence of violence, and most South Africans agree that reconciliation is impossible as long as gender-based violence persists in our society.

In a nutshell, South Africans want reconciliation and they want unity. But the country has a long way to go in addressing the many limiting factors that would – if addressed – help facilitate reconciliation, social-cohesion and unity processes.



THE YEAR 2019

Twenty nineteen marked a quarter of a century since South Africa's transition to democracy. In the same year that the country marked this achievement, it also conducted its sixth general election on 8 May 2019. Despite its many gains, the major election themes, like land distribution, reminded the country of the many historical legacies that it still grapples with, alongside new global challenges such as resurgent nationalism, rising trade tensions, a crippled global economy that struggles with coming to terms with growing mechanisation, and the ravages of climate change.

The interaction between these local and global dynamics also impacts on how we view democracy. Our current understanding of the concept implies both popular participation and government in the public interest – which can take a variety of forms. South Africa has a representative democracy, that is, South Africans vote for people/ political parties to represent their interests when government decisions are made. This is different from a direct democracy in which citizens are directly involved in every decision-making process.¹ To choose these representatives, South Africans register to vote participate in elections. While the number of registered voters in 2019 was just over 26.7 million South Africans, the eligible population (South Africans who are old enough to vote) was about 35.9 million people at the time. This puts the registration rate at 74.5% in 2019, as opposed to the 80.5% of South Africans who were registered for the 2014 national elections.² Only 65.99% of registered voters turned out to vote in the 2019 elections, in comparison with the turnout of 89.3% registered voters two decades ago in 1999³ and a 73.48% turnout in 2014.⁴ In particular, concerns were raised over youth voting participation – specifically those younger than 30 years of age.⁵ Voting apathy, however, should not necessarily be assumed to be indicative of political apathy, but it does raise questions pertaining to the relationship between state, representatives and citizens – and (perceived) responsiveness and accountability.

An often overlooked level of accountability is that of political parties as private organisations. Political parties consist of a group of people with shared interests and similar political aims. They exist to influence public policy and to exercise power in government – or in opposition to government – by getting elected to public office.⁶

1 Heywood, A. 2007. *Politics* (3rd ed). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

2 Jones, A. 2019. Voter registration down from 2019. *GroundUp*, 29 January 2019. Available online: <https://www.groundup.org.za/article/voter-registration-rate-down-2014/>.

3 Morais, S. 2019. Voter turnout trending down, could be lowest in 25 years. *News24*, 9 May 2019. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/elections/news/voter-turnout-trending-down-could-be-lowest-in-25-years-20190509>.

4 South African History Online (SAHO). 2019. South Africa's 2019 general elections – post-analysis. Available online: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/south-africas-2019-general-election-post-analysis>.

5 Clifford, C. 2019. Quick read: South Africa's 2019 election in numbers. *Africa Check*, 27 May 2019. Available online: <https://africacheck.org/reports/quick-read-south-africas-2019-election-in-numbers/>.

6 Fakir, E. & Lodge, T. 2013. *Political parties in Africa*. South Africa: Jacana Media.

THE YEAR 2019 CONTINUED

Political parties are often referred to as the vehicles of democracy, but are still private organisations with their own internal dynamics and challenges.

President Cyril Ramaphosa led the incumbent African National Congress (ANC) which won the National Assembly election, albeit with a reduced majority of 57.50% – the ANC's lowest share of the vote in national elections since the end of apartheid in 1994,⁷ after a steady decline in support over the last three national elections.⁸ The electoral decline of a liberation movement that became a ruling political party can be attributed to four broad reasons: opposition coordination; institutional or electoral reforms; a high level of corruption and gross abuse of office; and factional conflict within the dominant party.⁹ According to Isike,¹⁰ the first two reasons – fragmented opposition and institutional or electoral reform – help with the preservation of the ANC's dominance as a political party in South Africa. The latter two – corruption and abuse of office, and factionalism – threaten this dominance. Testimony presented at the Zondo Judicial Commission of Inquiry Into Allegations of State Capture (henceforth the Zondo Commission), pointing to the extent of corruption, and how it hampers service delivery while adversely affecting public trust in the ruling party and government provided a prime example of the former.¹¹ Headed by deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo, this public inquiry, instituted by President Cyril Ramaphosa in August 2018, aims to 'investigate allegations of State Capture, Corruption, Fraud and other allegations in the Public Sector including Organs of State'¹² in South Africa. Most testimonies given to the inquiry have focused on allegations of corruption during the administration of former President and former ANC party leader Jacob Zuma. Zuma, who stepped down as party president in December 2017 and resigned as president of the country in February 2018 while facing a motion of no confidence in Parliament during February 2018¹³ is also facing serious criminal charges (16 in total), including one count of racketeering, two counts of corruption, one count of money laundering, and 12 counts of fraud relating to 783 payments he allegedly received in connection with the controversial arms deal¹⁴ struck during the 1990s when Zuma was deputy president to then President Thabo Mbeki.¹⁵

Voter support for the Democratic Alliance (DA) – the official opposition led by Mmusi Maimane (at the time) – also declined from 22.23% to 20.77%, while support for the relative newcomer, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – led by Julius Malema – grew from 6.35% in 2014 to 10.79% in 2019. Support for the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) also grew, from 2.40% to 3.38%, while support for the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) grew from 0.9% to 2.38%.¹⁶ The DA faced its own challenges – most notably in the form of leadership crises – prior to and after the 2019 national elections. Prior to the 2019 elections, Patricia de Lille left the DA and mayoralty of Cape Town in

7 BusinessTech. 2019. South African national election 2019 final result. 11 May 2019. Available online: <https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/316134/south-african-national-election-2019-final-results/>.

8 Isike, C. 2019. Factionalism and corruption could kill the ANC – unless it kills both first. *The Conversation*, 12 May 2019. Available online: <https://theconversation.com/factionalism-and-corruption-could-kill-the-anc-unless-it-kills-both-first-116924>.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG). Judicial Commission of Inquiry Into Allegations of State Capture (Call for evidence/information). Available online: <https://pmg.org.za/call-for-comment/694/>.

13 Burke, J. 2018. Jacob Zuma resigns as South Africa's president on eve of no-confidence vote. *The Guardian*, 14 February 2018. Available online: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/jacob-zuma-resigns-south-africa-president>.

14 Chabalala, J. 2019. Court disregarded the incontrovertible evidence of political interference in prosecution – Zuma. *News24*, 5 November 2019. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/court-disregarded-the-incontrovertible-evidence-of-political-interference-in-prosecution-zuma-20191105>.

15 BusinessDay, 2019. Jacob Zuma goes to court to face charge of corruption. 15 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-10-15-jacob-zuma-goes-to-court-to-face-charge-of-corruption/>.

16 Chutel, L. 2019. South Africa's election result had few surprises, except one rude awakening. *Quartz Africa*, 11 May 2019. Available online: <https://qz.com/africa/1617103/south-africa-election-anc-down-eff-up-democratic-alliance-down/>.

October 2018 after what is said to have been ‘a long and bruising battle with the party leadership’.¹⁷ De Lille subsequently formed her own party, GOOD, which won two seats in the National Assembly in the 2019 elections. During October 2019, post the elections, the DA made news with further resignations from key leadership positions in the party. Shortly after the election of Helen Zille – former premier of the Western Cape who had briefly retired from politics – as the party’s federal council chairperson, City of Johannesburg Mayor Herman Mashaba announced his resignation from the DA and as a councillor, stating:

*I cannot reconcile myself with a group of people who believe that race is irrelevant in the discussion of inequality and poverty in South Africa in 2019. I cannot reconcile myself with people who do not see that South Africa is more unequal today than it was in 1994 ...*¹⁸

His resignation was followed by the resignations of then party leader Mmusi Maimane from both the DA and as a member of Parliament, as well as that of Athol Trollip from his then position as DA federal chairperson. Maimane cited, as factors contributing to his decision, ‘a consistent and coordinated attempt’ to undermine his leadership, as well as a smear campaign attempting to destroy his name and integrity that placed his family in danger.¹⁹ The EFF also had its fair share of controversies ranging from accusations of sexual exploitation and bullying behaviour by senior leaders, to accusations of racial prejudice, to allegations of corruption – including in relation to tenders and illicit payments/donations by VBS Mutual Bank before its collapse.²⁰ In addition, the EFF was found guilty of defamation of character in May 2019 when former Finance Minister Trevor Manuel took the party and two of its members to court.²¹ The party was furthermore found to have contravened the South African Electoral Code by inciting its supporters to harass journalist Karima Brown,²² while journalist Ranjeni Munusamy and the South African National Editors Forum (SANEF) lodged an affidavit in December 2018 detailing threatening remarks, intimidation, harassment and personal attacks made by EFF party members towards her and other journalists.²³

With access to, and a free flow of, information being critical for popular decision-making, the media has a vital role to play in democratic states. Its efficacy in reflecting the range of interests across a society has the potential to enhance or diminish political trust and engagement, and can have an impact on citizens’ orientations towards (and understanding of) their own agency as political actors.²⁴

The South African media thus plays a pivotal role in South Africa’s democratic society, and at this critical juncture its independence remains essential for it to fulfil this role responsibly.²⁵ Currently, however, both public and private outlets face multiple challenges, which include: susceptibility to factional party politics; declining advertising revenues that have led to budget cuts and retrenchments; and only moderate success in migrating from print news sources to online sources. The cumulative impact of this has been media concentration in large corporate hands at the expense of community media.²⁶

17 Gerber, J. 2019. I warned Mmusi Maimane, says De Lille as she wishes him a GOOD time. *News24*, 23 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/i-warned-mmusi-maimane-says-de-lille-as-she-wishes-him-a-good-time-20191023>.

18 Mailovich, C. 2019. Joburg mayor Herman Mashaba resigns. *Business Day*, 21 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-10-21-joburg-mayor-herman-mashaba-resigns/>.

19 Mokone, T. 2019. I will keep serving SA: Mmusi Maimane, as he resigns from Parliament. *TimesLive*, 24 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-10-24-i-will-keep-serving-sa-mmusi-maimane-as-he-resigns-from-parliament-too/>.

20 Van Wyk, P. 2019. ‘Cruising nicely’ on VBS: EFF’s parties, lies and looted money. *Daily Maverick*, 27 May 2019. Available online: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-05-27-cruising-nicely-on-vbs-effs-parties-lies-and-looted-money/>.

21 Fin24. 2019. EFF ordered to apologise to Trevor Manuel, pay R500 000 in damages. 30 May 2019. Available online: <https://www.fin24.com/Economy/just-in-eff-ordered-to-apologise-to-trevor-manuel-for-defamatory-and-false-claims-20190530>.

22 Chabalala, J. 2019. Journalist Karima Brown wins case against EFF. *News24*, 6 June 2019. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/journalist-karima-brown-wins-case-against-eff-20190606>.

23 Munusamy, R. 2018. Supporting affidavit: Navaranjeni Munusamy. South African National Editors Forum, 19 December 2019. Available online: <http://www.sanef.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Part-2.pdf>.

24 Camaja, L. 2014. Media use and political trust in emerging democracy: Setting the institutional trust in Kosovo. *International Journal of Communications*, 8:187–209.

25 South African Press Council: Code of Ethics and Conduct for Print and Online Media. Available online: <https://accountablejournalism.org/ethics-codes/code-of-ethics-and-conduct-for-south-african-print-and-online-media>.

26 Fontyn, Y. 2017. Media is in the crucible of change and conflict. *Business Day*, 1 February 2017.

THE YEAR 2019 CONTINUED

Within the context of political and election coverage, the phenomenon of political polarisation around elections – as has in recent years been the case in the United States, Kenya, Colombia and Brazil – and, to this day, the consequences of the Brexit referendum offer additional challenges. These election periods have highlighted the rise of ‘fake news’/disinformation or misinformation, the presence and sometimes predominance of extreme ideologies and identity politics in media and discourse, and citizen engagement with various forms of political participation other than voting – such as protesting and, in some instances, political violence. Furthermore, the use and impact of social media (as a non-traditional source of information) on democratic political culture in South Africa are still relatively uncertain –and what the measures may be to keep such media sources accountable are even more so.

Coupled with political challenges, social and economic indicators paint a bleak picture of South Africans’ socio-economic circumstances. After 1994 and the country’s transition to democracy, South Africa made considerable progress towards improving the well-being of its citizens. However, progress is arguably slowing²⁷ with some concerning trends. South Africa, with a consumption expenditure Gini coefficient of 0.63 in 2015 (an increase from 0.61 in 1996), is one of the most unequal countries in the world. The country grapples with a historical legacy of exclusion, limited intergenerational mobility, and slow economic growth which does not generate sufficient employment opportunities, thereby perpetuating inequalities.²⁸

The most recent release of Statistics SA’s (StatsSA) Living Conditions Survey (LCS)²⁹ – conducted in 2014/2015 – shows that approximately half (49.2%) of the South African adult population was living below the upper-bound poverty line (UBPL) at the time. When looking at the poverty headcount by sex using the UBPL, the survey shows that adult females experienced higher levels of poverty when compared with their male counterparts, regardless of the poverty line used. Female-headed households also mostly felt the experience of poverty. The poverty gap (the distance away from the poverty line) and severity of poverty measures were greater for female-headed households compared with households headed by males.³⁰ Based on the international poverty line of \$1.90 per day,³¹ 18.8% of South Africans were poor in 2015 – a decline from 33.8% in 1996. Possible factors contributing to this decline include real income growth, the expansion of social safety nets, and access to basic services. The 2015 figure, however, represents a two-percentage point increase from the 16.8% that was recorded in 2011. Contributing factors to this renewed upward trajectory in poverty include weak growth since the global financial crisis in 2008, and low employment due to a pronounced skills mismatch in the labour market.³² At 29.1% in October 2019, unemployment reached its highest levels in 11 years. Of particular concern is the figure of 58.2% for young people between the ages of 15–24.³³

With 28.8% (17 million) of South Africa’s population aged between 0 and 14 years of age and 35.5% (20.6 million) aged between 15 and 34 years of age (i.e. over two-thirds of the total population falls in the youth category), South Africa’s youth bulge may present opportunities to unleash a potential demographic dividend. However, the majority of South Africa’s adult youth (between 18 and 34 years of age) – constituting almost a third of the South African population – often falls within one of three categories: poorly educated, unemployed or

27 World Bank. South Africa Overview. Available online: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview>.

28 Ibid.

29 The Living Conditions Survey (LCS) forms part of Stats SA’s household survey programme and provides detailed information on households’ living circumstances as well as their income and expenditure patterns.

30 StatsSA. 2019. Five facts about poverty in SA. Available online: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12075>.

31 Based on 2011 Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates. See World Bank. South Africa overview. Available online: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/southafrica/overview> <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12075>.

32 Ibid.

33 Omarjee, L. 2019. Unemployment hits highest level in more than 11 years. Fin24, 29 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.fin24.com/Economy/South-Africa/breaking-unemployment-hits-highest-level-in-more-than-11-years-20191029>.

unemployable.³⁴ Of further concern is that 12 810 000 children (those under 18 years of age) were living in income poverty in 2017 (using the UBPL of R1 138), or 65.4% of all children in South Africa.³⁵

At present, government has limited fiscal space to respond to these challenges. Following successive years of muted growth, lower than expected tax revenues, and state-owned enterprises that are bleeding the fiscus, public resources are lacking to confront them head-on. Faced with difficult choices, Finance Minister Tito Mboweni in his mid-term budget policy statement (MTBPS) in October 2019 elicited mixed responses when he announced proposed cuts in state expenditure and the possibility of tax increases for higher income earners.³⁶ Mentioning depressed economic growth, a projected tax shortfall of R53bn, the recurrent bailouts of state-owned enterprises (such as Eskom and SAA), he highlighted the state's reduced scope to increase spending on its key priorities like education and health. According to Mboweni, the country's national debt now stands at more than R3 trillion (61% of gross domestic product (GDP)) and may grow to R4.5 trillion by 2022/2023 (71.3% of GDP).³⁷

These figures surprised even the most pessimistic analysts and shortly after the MTBPS, Moody's Investors Services cut South Africa's investment credit rating outlook to negative. Although this downgrade did not yet result in sub-investment status, as has been the case with the ratings of the other two major ratings agencies, Fitch and Standard and Poor, the possibility of it happening in early 2020 cannot be excluded. In the event that this should happen, the country may lose its coveted listing on the FTSE World Government Bond Index, which would compel large funds to sell their South African government bonds. In light of this, a downgrade would raise borrowing costs, complicating the government's efforts to balance the budget.³⁸ On the upside, a total of R363 billion in investment commitments was made at the second instalment of the South Africa Investment Conference in November 2019. This follows R300 billion in investment commitments made at the conference's debut in 2018, at which President Ramaphosa announced his intention to attract R1.2 trillion over five years.³⁹

Safety and violence present their own challenges for South Africa. Crime levels in South Africa frequently rank as among the highest in the world, especially in terms of violent crimes (such as murder and rape).⁴⁰ Of the crime statistics available, the most reliable are those with regard to murder rates, given that murder is independently verifiable (while certain types of crimes may be under-reported).⁴¹ During September 2019, Police Minister Bheki Cele announced a spike in murders, rapes and armed robberies in the country.⁴² Crime statistics released by the South African Police Service (SAPS) for the 2018/2019 year showed an increase of 56 to 58 murders per day on average,⁴³ as well as a 4.6% increase in rape and other sexual offences.⁴⁴ Over the past seven years,

34 StatsSA. 2019. SA population reaches 58.8 million. Available online: <http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=12362>.

35 Hall, K. and Sambu, W. 2019. Income poverty, unemployment and social grants. South African Child Gauge 2018. Available online: http://www.ci.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/367/Child_Gauge/South_African_Child_Gauge_2018/Chapters/income%20poverty%2C%20unemployment%20and%20social%20grants.pdf.

36 Davis, G. 2019. State spending cuts, higher taxes doing more harm than good, Parly told. Eyewitness News, 06 November 2019. Available online: <https://ewn.co.za/2019/11/06/state-spending-cuts-higher-taxes-doing-more-harm-than-good-parliament-told>.

37 Cronje, J. 2019. Mboweni's medium-term budget in a nutshell. *Fin24*, 30 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.fin24.com/Budget/mbowenis-medium-term-budget-in-a-nutshell-20191030>.

38 Bloomberg. 2019. The Moody's mystery: how has South Africa not been junked yet? *BusinessTech*, 01 November 2019. Available online: <https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/350717/the-moodys-mystery-how-has-south-africa-not-been-junked-yet/>.

39 SA News. 2019. These companies will invest billions of rands in South Africa. *BusinessTech*, 7 November 2019. Available online: <https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/351941/these-companies-will-invest-billions-of-rands-in-south-africa/>.

40 *BusinessTech*. 2017. South Africa ranks among the most dangerous countries in the world – and it's costing us. Available online at: <https://businesstech.co.za/news/lifestyle/200044/south-africa-ranks-among-the-most-dangerous-countries-in-the-world-and-its-costing-us/>.

41 Africa Check. 2018. FACTSHEET: South Africa's crime statistics for 2017/18. Available online at: <https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-crime-statistics-for-2017-18/>.

42 Qodashe, Z. 2019. SA sees increase in 2018/2019 crime rate. *SABSNewsOnline*, 12 September 2019. Available online: <http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/sa-sees-increase-in-2018-2019-crimes-rate/>.

43 Du Plessis, A. and Falanga, G. 2019. Policing alone cannot solve South Africa's violence. ISS Crime Hub, 12 September 2019. Available online: <https://issafrica.org/crimehub/analysis/press-releases/policing-alone-cannot-solve-south-africas-violence>.

44 Qodashe, Z. 2019. SA sees increase in 2018/2019 crime rate. *SABSNewsOnline*, 12 September 2019. Available online: <http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/sa-sees-increase-in-2018-2019-crimes-rate/>.

THE YEAR 2019 CONTINUED

murder has risen by 35%, thus reversing the downward trend that was evident between 1995 and 2011 (during which time murder decreased by 55%).⁴⁵ High levels of violence and insecurity have an impact on the economy, with the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) measuring the cost of violence to South Africa at 22.3% of the country's GDP in its 2017 Global Peace Index (GPI) report.⁴⁶ In addition, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) buckles under the weight of rising crime while being understaffed. The NPA's annual report shows a sharp decrease in the number of new cases that reach it, an increase in the number of cases that have been withdrawn, a decline in the number of finalised cases, and – although the NPA increased its conviction rates for certain crimes – a prosecution rate that remains low. Furthermore, the NPA has 4 408 posts, of which 1 142 are currently vacant, while no appointments have been made since 2016 due to a lack of funding.⁴⁷ The finance minister did announce, during his mid-term budget speech, that the NPA would receive an additional R1.3 billion over the medium term, thereby bringing much-needed resources to the prosecuting authority.⁴⁸ It is, however, not only the economy, budget and institutions that are impacted by violence and crime. Crime, coupled with limited capacity to prosecute perpetrators, has implications for citizens and their lived and perceived levels of safety, thus affecting the fibre of South African society. While the rule of law and effective criminal justice are important components of combatting crime, they alone are not sufficient in securing public safety. Violence prevention – in particular given the country's violent past – is essential to help reverse the trends of crime and violence in South Africa.⁴⁹

This year furthermore saw xenophobic, gender-intolerant and racist incidents of speech. In curbing discrimination, some progress has been made with the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, a bill aimed at reducing offensive speech and curbing hate crimes in South Africa. The Bill was introduced in 2016 and is currently before the South African National Assembly for consideration. Some of the stated intentions of the legislation include to 'provide for the prevention of hate crimes and hate speech' and to 'provide for effective enforcement measures' against those who express their 'prejudice or intolerance towards the victim'.⁵⁰ The Bill has been subject to much debate, with some expressing concern over the implications of restricting speech and others contending that the Bill is necessary given the level of discrimination in South Africa.⁵¹ It is, however, not only the violent and criminal incidents that should leave us concerned, but also the attitudes, beliefs and myths that underpin discriminatory and intolerant actions.

In similar vein, South Africa's Equality Court ruled that flying the apartheid-era flag in South Africa is now considered a crime in most circumstances. During August 2019, Judge Phineas Mojapelo ruled that the 'gratuitous' display of the flag amounted to hate speech, racial discrimination and harassment under the Equality Act. Exceptions to this ruling were the use of the flag in circumstances that served the public interest – for example in art, academia or journalism. Judge Mojapelo acknowledged that the meaning of the flag is unfortunately still divisive, as, for 'those who did not suffer and benefited under pre-democracy rule', the flag is a symbol of heritage, while, for those oppressed under apartheid and those 'genuinely against apartheid rule',

45 Du Plessis, A. and Falanga, G. 2019. Policing alone cannot solve South Africa's violence. ISS Crime Hub, 12 September 2019. Available online: <https://issafrica.org/crimehub/analysis/press-releases/policing-alone-cannot-solve-south-africas-violence>.

46 Global Peace Index (GPI). 2017. Measuring peace in a complex world. Institute for Economics and Peace. Available online at: <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/06/GPI-2017-Report-1.pdf>.

47 Versluis, J., & De Lange, J. 2019. Rising crime, low prosecution rates: How law enforcement in SA has all but collapsed. City Press, 21 October 2019. Available online: <https://citypress.news24.com/News/rising-crime-low-prosecution-rates-how-law-enforcement-in-sa-has-all-but-collapsed-20191021>.

48 Mailovich, C. 2019. Cash-strapped NPA gets a cash injection over the medium-term. Business Day, 30 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-10-30-cash-strapped-npa-gets-a-cash-injection-over-the-medium-term>.

49 Du Plessis, A. & Falanga, G. 2019. Policing alone cannot solve South Africa's violence. ISS Crime Hub, 12 September 2019. Available online: <https://issafrica.org/crimehub/analysis/press-releases/policing-alone-cannot-solve-south-africas-violence>.

50 Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill. Available online: Parliament.gov.za.

51 Isaack, W. 2017. South African move on hate speech a step too far. News24, 21 February 2017. Available online: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/21/south-african-move-hate-speech-step-too-far>.

the flag serves as a reminder of racist oppression by government that took years to overturn. Also subject to much debate was the contention that displaying the flag is not hate speech unless coupled with calls for action to inflict harm.⁵²

Amidst these circumstances, South African activism was elevated in response to the many challenges and lived realities of those living in South Africa – addressing local, national and global concerns. In response to horrific incidents of gender-based violence, thousands of South Africans took to the streets during September 2019, calling for action from all sectors – including government, business, civil society, faith-based organisations and the international community.⁵³ Moreover, communities gathered around local concerns, such as the 200 pupils from various public schools in King William's Town marching to the offices of the Eastern Cape Department of Education demanding basic infrastructure.⁵⁴ More than 1 000 refugees and asylum seekers gathered to demand that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) evacuate them from South Africa due to safety concerns.⁵⁵ South Africans also joined in on global concerns, including coming out in support of the #ClimateStrike, with over 1 000 people marching to Parliament and groups gathering across the country during September 2019 to raise awareness in this regard.⁵⁶ And some gathered to celebrate South Africa, with over 700 000 South Africans joining the #IamStaying group – started as a space where South Africans can inspire one another and unite.⁵⁷ These then are just some of the many movements, groups and campaigns that started to raised awareness around certain issues, or to demand services and rights from institutions.

In the thick of all these political, social and economic dynamics, the sixteenth round of the SARB took place, providing insight regarding the perceptions of ordinary South Africans amidst all that is reported, purported and proclaimed. The present report captures the methodology of the 2019 SARB, followed by sentiments towards reconciliation and themes that arose from key indicators: democratic political culture; socio-economic circumstances and social justice; interpersonal and racial reconciliation; and violence and safety.

52 Mettler, K. 2019. South Africa bans most displays of the apartheid flag, a symbol of 'a crime against humanity'. *The Washington Post*, 22 August 2019. Available online: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08/22/south-africa-bans-most-displays-apartheid-flag-symbol-crime-against-humanity/>.

53 Bauer, N. 2019. South Africa: Protesters demand action on violence against women. *Al Jazeera*, 13 September 2019. Available online: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/south-africa-protesters-demand-action-violence-women-190913132640008.html>.

54 Damba-Hendrik, N. 2019. Eastern Cape pupils march to education department, demand basic infrastructure at schools. *News24*, 18 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/eastern-cape-pupils-march-to-education-department-demand-basic-infrastructure-at-schools-20191018>.

55 Ntseku, M. 2019. Refugee sit-in at UNHCR office in Cape Town gains momentum. *IOL*, 23 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/refugee-sit-in-at-unhcr-office-in-cape-town-gains-momentum-35629605>.

56 Shoba, S., Postamn, Z., Mbovane, T. and Masixole, F. 2019. #ClimateStrike: 'You'll die of old age. I'll die of climate change,' SA protesters warn. *News24*, 20 September 2019. Available online: <https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/news/refugee-sit-in-at-unhcr-office-in-cape-town-gains-momentum-35629605https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/climatestrike-youll-die-of-old-age-ill-die-of-climate-change-sa-protesters-warn-20190920>.

57 702. 2019. #IamStaying initiative makes moves to become an NGO. Available online: <http://www.702.co.za/articles/364296/iamstaying-initiative-makes-moves-to-become-an-ngo>.



METHODOLOGY

2

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) is a cross-sectional, iterative public-opinion survey conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa on a regular basis since 2003. It is the world's longest-running public-opinion survey on national reconciliation and provides a nationally representative measure of South Africans' attitudes to reconciliation and several other important social and political indicators.

Questionnaire development and conceptual framework⁵⁸

To date, a total of 16 rounds of the survey have been conducted. The SARB went to field twice, in 2003 and 2004, and then once annually until 2013. Subsequently, the survey has been fielded biennially, with the most recent round carried out in 2019.

From 2003–2013, the survey used a quantitative questionnaire with approximately 100 items, most using the five-point Likert scale response format. This set of questionnaire items was revised and adapted over time based on pilot studies and changes in public discourse. However, the core set of survey items remained consistent throughout these changes to ensure continuity of time series analysis and comparisons. The SARB questionnaire is furthermore grounded in relevant qualitative research, conducted by the IJR in the form of focus group discussions in 2001 and 2011.

In 2013 and 2014, the SARB survey instrument underwent an extensive review in order to improve the survey questionnaire in conceptualisation and measurement of key constructs and variables. This process was concluded in early 2015, and the new survey was fielded later that year. The new survey builds on the strengths of the previous survey by improving the robustness of measurement scales and individual items.

Other than for measurement purposes, the regular review and revision of the survey ensured that the SARB was and continues to remain conceptually relevant and contemporary in the context of the various social, political, economic and cultural changes experienced in the country since its inception.

58 See Appendix A for the full conceptual frameworks.

METHODOLOGY CONTINUED

Questionnaires for the 2003 to 2013 rounds followed a set of hypotheses relating to:

- Human security;
- Political culture;
- Cross-cutting political relationships;
- Historical confrontation;
- Race relations;
- Dialogue; and
- Commitment to socio-economic development (2003 only).

In 2014, following extensive reliability and validity testing, the survey was updated for a new iteration. Since 2015, the SARB questionnaire has been built around specific conceptual domains, namely:

- Power relations;
- Democratic political culture;
- Apartheid legacy;
- Racial reconciliation;
- Improvement reconciliation; and
- Perception of change.

Fieldwork and data collection

All SARB rounds were conducted by means of face-to-face interviews, with the 2003 to 2015 rounds being conducted in six languages according to the preference of the respondent – English, Afrikaans, isiZulu, Sesotho, isiXhosa and Setswana. The 2017 and 2019 questionnaires were administered in English, isiZulu, isiXhosa, Sesotho and Afrikaans according to the preference of the respondent. Back-checks of interviews conducted by each fieldworker were done to ensure accuracy and consistency. Participation is always voluntary, based on full informed consent, and participants are free to withdraw from the survey at any time during the interview. No incentives are offered to respondents for their participation.

During 2003 to 2013, the SARB survey was conducted by Ipsos as part of its annual Khayabus survey focused on social and political trends. In each round, Ipsos selected a nationally representative sample of the South African adult population. The 2015 to 2019 rounds were conducted as stand-alone surveys by Kantar Public, using a nationally representative sample of the South African adult population. Stratified random sampling designs were employed in all SARB iterations, and all SARB datasets are returned to IJR in SPSS files, with a weighting variable to ensure national representivity.

The sampling approach employed for the 2019 SARB survey was consistent with previous SARB data-collection rounds, that is, a stratified, multistage random sample design was used. Province, race and geographic area (metro/non-Metro) were taken as the explicit stratification variables to ensure that good coverage and the best possible precision per stratum were achieved. Variables such as district and local municipality, main place and sub-place were used as implicit stratification variables to improve the representativeness of the sample. The total sample size for the 2019 round is 2 400 respondents. Fieldwork for the 2019 round took place during July to August 2019.

For the 2019 dataset, sample weights were benchmarked to the Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 2019 mid-year population estimates. The weights were within acceptable limits, with no observed abnormal or unusual skews. The final dataset was weighted to correct any disproportions that may have occurred due to several factors: unequal inclusion probabilities; non-response; and non-coverage and skewness resulting from sample design and fieldwork. The benchmark variables used in the integrated weighting are as follows: province, race, gender and age group.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ See Appendix A for realised vs. weighted samples.

OTHER THAN FOR MEASUREMENT PURPOSES, THE REGULAR REVIEW AND REVISION OF THE SURVEY ENSURED THAT THE SARB WAS AND CONTINUES TO REMAIN CONCEPTUALLY RELEVANT AND CONTEMPORARY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VARIOUS SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CHANGES EXPERIENCED IN THE COUNTRY SINCE ITS INCEPTION.

Reporting considerations

This report provides an overview of South African public opinion in relation to reconciliation as per the conceptual framework explained. All reported data has been weighted (unless stated otherwise) to be nationally representative of the adult South African population (18 years and older). Data has generally been analysed and presented using several key demographics, including age groups, geographic location, gender/sex,⁶⁰ (historically defined) race categories⁶¹ and LSM/SEM categories.⁶² Notes have been made for each measurement, indicating the exact questions asked and the response categories for each question. All data presented in this report is from the SARB survey conducted in 2019, unless stated otherwise.

In the report, reference is made to the use of indexes/scales and mean scores or values. An index is a way of compiling one score from a variety of questions or statements that collectively represent a belief, feeling or attitude. It allows for the creation of a composite measure that summarises responses for multiple related questions or statements.⁶³ Composite measures are much more robust than single items as single items may contain errors which compromise the belief or attitude being measured. If an item is used on its own, any flaws in measurement directly impact the belief or attitude being measured, whereas the impact of such flaws is mitigated when multiple items are used as individual items compensate for flaws in other items used in the measure. In the report, mean scores are presented for indexes constructed from SARB question items. These means are then compared in order to discern and understand differences for indexes across other factors.

Interviews on the findings from the 2019 SARB round were conducted with various IJR project leaders, senior project leaders and management during the month of October 2019. Quotes from these interviews are used throughout the report, with the full quotes from these interviews available in Appendix B.

The IJR grants access, on an application basis, to the Reconciliation Barometer survey datasets for purposes of secondary analysis. Researchers, civil society organisations, academics and students are encouraged to contact the Institute with regard to access requests. The most recent survey's data is, however, embargoed until the completion of the following survey round.⁶⁴

60 Survey response categories for the 'gender' demographic variable include 'male' and 'female'. The IJR recognises that this approach is binary, and recognises the conceptual difference between sex – which refers to physical characteristics assigned by birth – and gender – which refers to identity innate to respondents.

61 It is not the intent of the IJR to endorse the continued use of apartheid or colonial racial categories in South Africa. The use of such categories here are for analytical purposes only. In the report, survey responses are presented according to race categories where this is analytically meaningful and deemed relevant to the tracking of public opinion.

62 Both the LSM and the SEM are measures used to consider the socio-economic circumstances of respondents. The LSM (Living Standard Measure) is a wealth-based composite measure based on living standards rather than income. Its variety of survey items considers urbanisation and ownership. More information about the LSM can be found on the website of the South African Audience Research Foundation (SAARF). The recently developed SEM (socio-economic measure) can be regarded as a successor to the LSM, focusing more on lifestyles than durables as with the LSM. More information on the SEM is available on the website of the Publisher Researcher Council of South Africa.

63 Crossman, A. 2019. The differences between indexes and scales. ThoughtCo., 4 August 2019. Available online: <https://www.thoughtco.com/indexes-and-scales-3026544>.

64 See Appendix A for a note on SARB reports and data availability.



RECONCILIATION: WANTED ... AND POSSIBLE?

3

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) posits that, for reconciliation to advance, South Africans should feel connected to the concept (i.e. they can understand and articulate the meaning of reconciliation) and that they should have experienced it in their own lives. This indicator firstly attempts to ascertain the subjective meaning of reconciliation held by respondents, and then, according to their subjective meaning, to measure perceptions of improvement relating to reconciliation.⁶⁵

The meaning of reconciliation

Reconciliation is a complex term with different definitions and meanings associated with the concept. The SARB asks respondents to identify, from a list of options, the connotations that they attach to reconciliation. Respondents are given three response opportunities, which allows for the ranking of first responses and combined responses (combining first, second and third responses). Through this, South Africans' subjective meanings associated with reconciliation can be explored. Other questions in the SARB survey relating to reconciliation can then also be better understood with reference to the subjective association with the concept as identified through this question. The 2019 SARB survey shows that the meaning most closely associated with reconciliation is 'forgiveness', ranking first among first mentions and combined responses. Ranking second in combined mentions is 'peace', followed by 'moving on' ranked third, 'truth' ranked fourth, and 'respect' ranked fifth from the list of possible responses. Notably, the top-five ranked responses in the 2017 SARB were the exact same five items in a slightly different order, with 'forgiveness' ranking first, 'moving on' second, and 'peace' third.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ See Appendix A for more information on the SARB's conceptual domains.

⁶⁶ Potgieter, E. 2017. SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey: 2017 Report. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). Available online: www.ijr.org.za.

RECONCILIATION: WANTED ... AND POSSIBLE? CONTINUED


Table 1: Reported meaning of reconciliation, SARB 2019⁶⁷

	First response (%)	Second response (%)	Third response (%)	Combined responses (%)
Forgiveness – past victims forgiving past perpetrator	14.4	15.2	11.1	40.8
Peace – the reduction of violence and establishment of peace	10.7	12.6	10.0	33.3
Moving on – moving forward from the past	10.6	10.4	10.9	31.9
Truth – establishing the truth of the past	11.0	8.6	9.7	29.3
Respect – respecting people and people's humanity	7.9	9.2	11.0	28.2
Justice – redressing injustice/creating a more equal society	8.3	7.7	5.9	21.9
Democracy – building a democratic culture	7.0	5.7	7.0	19.7
Relationships – improving relationships between past enemies	6.0	5.5	6.5	18.0
Making amends – past perpetrators taking responsibility for their actions	4.6	5.8	5.8	16.3
Race relations – addressing racism	4.3	5.7	5.0	15.0
Compromise – two sides make compromises	3.0	3.5	5.2	11.7
Nothing – it has no meaning	5.6	2.3	2.5	10.5
Dialogue – finding ways to talk about the past	2.0	2.2	3.8	8.0
Retribution – past perpetrators punished for their actions	1.8	3.4	2.3	7.6
Memorialisation – remembering the past	2.3	2.0	3.0	7.3
Other – specify	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.4

Progress?

South Africans' understanding of what reconciliation is has implications regarding whether they have experienced reconciliation, whether they think it is needed, and whether they think South Africa has made progress with the reconciliation process. A vast majority of respondents – 77.1% – agree that South Africa still needs reconciliation, while just over half (56.9%) of the population agrees that South Africans have made progress concerning reconciliation since the end of apartheid. Just over half of the South African population (51.1%) also agrees that they have experienced reconciliation after the end of apartheid, with 66.1% agreeing that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) provided a good foundation for the reconciliation process in South Africa.

FIGURE 1: Perceived reconciliation progress, SARB 2019⁶⁸



⁶⁷ The question reads: 'What, if anything, does "reconciliation" mean to you?'. The response options are as per Table 1, with three responses asked for. 'Don't know' and 'refused' responses were rendered missing.

⁶⁸ Respondents were asked to indicate whether they agree or do not agree with various statements. The statements are as indicated in Figure 1. Response categories include 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree'), 'Neutral', and 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree'). 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis.

Reconciliation possible?

Figure 1 shows that South Africans identify the need for reconciliation and that more than two-thirds believe the TRC provided the proper foundation for reconciliation. However, less than half of South Africans have experienced it and believe that we have made progress with reconciliation. What then is hampering progress with reconciliation? The 2019 SARB asked respondents whether they agree or disagree that reconciliation is impossible as long as certain challenges in society remain.

FIGURE 2: Reconciliation barriers, SARB 2019⁶⁹




Figure 2 shows that 84.4% of South Africans agree that reconciliation is impossible as long as corruption continues in our country, while 74% agree that reconciliation is impossible as long as political parties exploit social divisions for political gains – thus highlighting the need for transparent, responsible and accountable (political) leadership. Interestingly, 73.3% of South Africans agree that reconciliation is impossible as long as those who were disadvantaged under apartheid remain poor, while 72.8% agree that reconciliation is impossible while race categories continue to be used to measure transformation – thus indicating the need for social justice, although the use of historical race categories to measure transformation gathers less support. Finally, 72% of South Africans agree that reconciliation is impossible as long as gender-based violence continues in our society, with 66.4% agreeing that reconciliation is impossible as long as racism remains unaddressed in our society.


Who needs to be involved?

Since 2017, the SARB has asked respondents who they think should take greater responsibility for ensuring reconciliation in South Africa, and whose involvement in the reconciliation process they think is important. Figure 3 shows that, in 2019, more than half (55.8%) of South Africans believe both those who were oppressed and those who were not oppressed are responsible for ensuring reconciliation in South Africa, while about a third of respondents (32.6%) report that those who were oppressed under apartheid carry the greatest responsibility for reconciliation. The latter finding should be understood in the context of the findings regarding the subjective meaning of reconciliation (see Table 1). Given that ‘forgiveness’ ranked first with regard to this question, it is understandable that the perceived weight of the reconciliation on many would lie with those who were oppressed during apartheid.

⁶⁹ Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with various statements. The statements are as indicated in Figure 2. Response categories include ‘Strongly agree’ and ‘Agree’ (combined to form ‘Agree’), ‘Neutral’, and ‘Disagree’ and ‘Strongly disagree’ (combined to form ‘Disagree’). ‘Don’t know’ responses were not included in the data analysis.


RECONCILIATION: WANTED ... AND POSSIBLE? CONTINUED

FIGURE 3: Perceived responsibility for ensuring reconciliation, SARB 2019⁷⁰



The SARB also explores perceptions regarding the involvement of various role-players. Figure 4 shows that the involvement of all the listed role-players is regarded as important by at least seven in ten South Africans (between 72.1% to 77.8% agreement for each respective role-players), but that their and their families' and friends' involvement is regarded as important by more South Africans than is the case for any of the other role-players mentioned.

FIGURE 4: Perceived importance of role-players' involvement in reconciliation, SARB 2019⁷¹



⁷⁰ The question reads: 'Who do you think should take the greatest responsibility for ensuring reconciliation in South Africa?' Response categories are as indicated in Figure 3.

⁷¹ The question reads: 'How important do you think the role of the following institutions/people is in the reconciliation process in South Africa?' The institutions/people – or role-players – are as indicated in Figure 4. Response categories included: 'Very important', 'Quite important', 'Somewhat important', 'Not very important' and 'Not important'.

MOST SOUTH AFRICANS ALSO REPORT THAT THE INVOLVEMENT OF VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS IS IMPORTANT FOR RECONCILIATION, IN PARTICULAR THEIR AND THEIR FAMILIES' AND FRIEND'S INVOLVEMENT, WHILE MANY FOSTER THE BELIEF THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RECONCILIATION LIES BOTH WITH THOSE WHO WERE OPPRESSED AND THOSE WHO WERE NOT OPPRESSED DURING APARTHEID.

In summary

A vast majority of respondents agree that South Africa still needs reconciliation, although only about half report that they have experienced reconciliation or believe that South Africa has made progress with reconciliation. The concepts South Africans most closely associate with that of reconciliation are forgiveness, peace, moving on, truth and respect. Concepts related to justice, retribution, racial reconciliation, compromise and dialogue rank lower. This does not, however, mean that these matters do not impact reconciliation processes according to South Africans. Most respondents agree that reconciliation is impossible as long as: corruption continues in our country; political parties sow division; those who were affected by apartheid continue to be poor; gender-based violence continues in our country; we continue to use racial categories to measure transformation; and racism remains unaddressed in our society. Most South Africans also report that the involvement of various stakeholders is important for reconciliation, in particular their and their families' and friend's involvement, while many foster the belief that responsibility for reconciliation lies both with those who were oppressed and those who were not oppressed during apartheid.

The above findings indicate that there are many aspects of society that can be improved upon in the eyes of ordinary South Africans in order to support the reconciliation process, with the involvement of various stakeholders being harnessed. The following sections of this report will explore these various aspects in greater depth, providing for an opportunity to consider both the opportunities and challenges that the reconciliation process in South Africa faces.



DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE

4

The SARB's methodology posits that reconciliation is more likely to thrive in a society where there is a growing democratic political culture. This is evident when citizens feel part of an inclusive nation, participate in the political process, believe that the government is legitimately elected, respect the rule of law, and support democratic political institutions. The SARB considers societal aspects such as political community, political efficacy, the rule of law, and confidence in democratic institutions.

Confidence in institutions

Three levels of trust that play a role as part of society's overall cohesiveness can be differentiated:⁷² bonding trust between people in the same group, bridging trust between different groups, and linking trust between society (with its respective groups) and institutions – most notably the state. In South Africa's diverse (in terms of race, ethnicity, language, class, etc.) post-conflict society grappling with the legacies of a divisive colonial and apartheid past, intergroup cohesion and the role of a legitimate state in facilitating cohesion are especially important.⁷³

The 2019 SARB shows an increase in confidence in every listed institution included in the survey from 2017 to 2019. The findings also show that, as in 2017, the institution South Africa has the most confidence in is the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), with 57.7% of South Africans stating that they have 'Quite a lot' or 'A great deal' of confidence in the institution – up 7% from 50.7% with confidence in the SABC in 2017. The institution South Africans have the second-most confidence in is the president, with 48.4% of South Africans stating that they have 'Quite a lot' or 'A great deal' of confidence in current President Cyril Ramaphosa – up 24.5% from 2.9% confidence in 2017 when, under Zuma's presidency, the president was the least trusted institution of all listed. The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is the third-most trusted institution, with 45.5% of South Africans reporting that they have 'A great deal' or 'Quite a lot' of confidence in the tax collector in 2019 – up 5.6% from 39.8% confidence in 2017. At the other end of the scale, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) garnered the least confidence in 2019, with 32.2%


72 Aldrich, D.P. 2012. *Building resilience: Social capital in post-disaster recovery*. Chicago: Chicago University Press; Fukuyama, F. 2002. Social capital and development: The coming agenda. *SAIS Review* 22(1):23–37; Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K. & Demarest, L. 2015. Conceptualising and measuring social cohesion in Africa: Towards a perceptions-based index, fn 7. Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD), Working Paper No. 21. Available online: <http://soc.kuleuven.be/crpd/files/working-papers/wp21.pdf>.

73 Meiring, T. and Potgieter, E. 2017. Towards a Social Cohesion Index for South Africa using SARB data. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). Working Paper 1, Reconciliation and Development Series. Available online: <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/towards-a-social-cohesion-index-for-south-africa-using-sarb-data/?portfolioCats=49>.

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE CONTINUED

of South Africans reporting confidence in the institution, although this is a 2% increase in confidence from 30.2% in 2017. Local government follows the NPA closely, being the second-least trusted institution with 33.5% of South Africans reporting confidence in this institution. The Public Protector also did not fare well, with 34.2% of South Africans reporting confidence in what should be a custodian of accountable governance of public funds. The percentage of South Africans who report that they have not heard enough to say how much confidence they have in the NPA and Public Protector – 12.4% and 9.9%, respectively – should, however, be noted. The Constitutional Court also managed to gain some public confidence, from 35.4% of South Africans reporting they have ‘Quite a lot’ or ‘A great deal’ of confidence in the institution in 2017, to 40% in 2019.

FIGURE 5: Reported confidence in institutions, SARB 2019⁷⁴



⁷⁴ The question reads: ‘Please indicate how much confidence you have in each of the following institutions, or haven’t you heard enough to say?’ Response categories are: ‘Not at all’, ‘Not very much’, ‘Somewhat’, ‘Quite a lot’, ‘A great deal’ and ‘Haven’t heard enough to say’.

In terms of confidence in Parliament, a significant decline in confidence is evident from 2006, with a decrease from 29.6% to 14.6% of South Africans in 2019 reporting 'A great deal' of confidence – 14.6% is, however, an increase from 12.6% in 2017. A similar pattern is seen for national government, provincial government and local government, with a significant decline in confidence from 2006 to 2019, but a slight increase in confidence from 2017 to 2019. However, those with 'A great deal' of confidence in the Constitutional Court continued to drop from 2017 to 2019.

Table 2: South Africans with 'A great deal' of confidence in institutions, SARB 2006–2019⁷⁵

	Parliament	National government	Provincial government	Local government	Constitution Court
2006	29.6	33	26	18.3	24.0
2007	20.9	20.7	15.2	10.8	17.1
2008	16.6	16.4	10.7	8.1	12.2
2009	16.2	18.8	11.7	9.2	14.5
2010	21.8	23.7	17.7	12.1	19.8
2011	18.9	22.0	13.6	11.0	20.5
2012	23.5	25.2	22.7	15.9	24.5
2013	18.5	19.9	17.3	16.1	19.5
2015	14.3	18.7	*	14.8	17.3
2017	12.6	10.2	9.9	9.2	15.7
2019	14.6	14.5	12.2	10.3	14.3


* Indicates institution was not asked about in that year.

National elections

In terms of confidence in political parties (see Figure 5), the ANC garnered the most confidence of the three most-supported parties in 2019, with 47.3% of South Africans indicating that they have 'A great deal' or 'Quite a lot' of confidence in the incumbent party – a 14.3% increase in confidence from 33% in 2017. At the same time, 56.2% of South Africans reported that they feel close to the ANC (see Figure 6). Confidence in the EFF and DA, however, is dismally low, with only 24.8% of South Africans reporting confidence in the relative newcomer, and 26.1% of South Africans reporting confidence in the DA as the official opposition – although confidence in both increased from the SARB's findings in 2017.

In terms of support for political parties, 56.2% of South Africans indicated that they feel close to the ANC, with 18% stating that they do not feel close to any political party and 11.4% feeling close to the DA, followed by 7.1% feeling close to the EFF and 6.9% to other parties.

FIGURE 6: South Africans who feel close to a specific party, SARB 2019⁷⁶




⁷⁵ Response categories are as indicated in note 74 in this section. Response categories for the SARB rounds for 2006 to 2015 did not include 'Somewhat'. This was added in 2017 to ensure a more precise measure. 'Not at all' and 'A great deal' responses can be compared over time, as the added category mainly improved on the middle response categories.

⁷⁶ The question reads: 'Many people feel close to a particular political party, although they may occasionally vote for a different political party. Which political party do you feel close to?' Response options include all political parties in Parliament, as well as the options 'Other' and 'Don't feel close to a political party' ('None' in Figure 6).

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE CONTINUED

'Feeling close' to a political party does not, however, guarantee support during elections and/or whether South Africans will turn out to vote. Although 77% of South Africans indicated that they are both registered and voted, IEC (Electoral Commission of South Africa) voting data shows that only 66% of registered voters voted. However, 75% of eligible voters were registered for the 2019 national elections – showing that some respondents possibly responded with what they may regard as the desirable response to this question.

FIGURE 7: Reported voting in the 2019 elections, SARB 2019⁷⁷




Political efficacy and political participation

The above findings relating to confidence in institutions and to voting raise a couple of questions regarding political and voting efficacy – citizens' belief that they can understand and influence political affairs – and populist sentiments. Figure 8 shows that the main concern in terms of political participation is not only that South Africans do not feel qualified or informed enough to participate, with almost half (48.4%) agreeing that they do not feel qualified enough to participate in issues affecting our country, but also, and even more so, that politicians are experienced as unresponsive – with a staggering 86.8% of South Africans agreeing that politicians talk too much and take too little action. Coupled with this, voting efficacy is concerningly low, with 58.9% of South Africans agreeing that their vote does not make a difference. Some solidarity seems to exist among South Africans, with 71.9% of South Africans agreeing that they can rely on each other rather than on politicians. An interesting finding, in particular in a representative democracy, is that 74.9% of South Africans agree that 'the people' should have the final say on political issues by voting on them directly in referendums. From this we can deduce that accountability and responsiveness of political leaders are of utmost importance in rebuilding political and voting efficacy among South Africans.

⁷⁷ The question reads: 'Are you registered to vote? And did you vote in the most recent provincial and national elections on the 8th of May this year?' The response options are as per the statements in Figure 7.

FIGURE 8: Political efficacy, voting efficacy and populist sentiments, SARB 2019⁷⁸



Using the applicable items discussed above, scales were constructed to measure respondents' inclination to views that are increasingly being capitalised upon by populist political movements in other parts of the world. These related specifically to respondents perceived levels of political and voting efficacy. Scores for each scale ranged from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating greater adherence to populist sentiments for the populism scale, while for the political and voting efficacy scales higher scores indicate greater levels of perceived efficacy. Confirming the sentiment above, South Africa's mean score for the populism scale is above the midpoint score of 3 at 4.01, while the means for the efficacy scales are both lower than the midpoint of 3, indicating low levels of perceived efficacy, more especially for voting efficacy.

⁷⁸ The question reads: 'Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements about politics and voting.' The statements are as indicated in Figure 8. Response categories include 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 8), and 'Neither agree nor disagree', 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree'. 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis.


DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE CONTINUED

Table 3: Mean scores – populism scale, and political- and voting-efficacy scales, SARB 2019⁷⁹

	Mean (South Africa)
Populism scale	4.01
Political-efficacy scale	2.61
Voting-efficacy scale	2.33

The above findings regarding political and voting efficacy do not mean that South Africans are not participating in political activities, either conventional or unconventional. As shown in Figure 9, more than half of South Africans (53.6%) have attended a community meeting, and four in ten (41%) have got together with others to raise an issue. Over one in four South Africans (26.4%) have contacted their local councillor or other community leaders about an issue, with about four in ten (38.1%) South Africans reporting they would do so if they had the opportunity. In terms of unconventional forms of political participation, 8.1% of South Africans report that they have used force or violence for a political cause – a decrease from 12% who indicated the same in 2017 (see Figure 10); while 5.9% indicated that they refused to pay a tax or fee to the government – also a decrease from 9.6% who indicated the same in 2017.

FIGURE 9: Citizens' political participation, SARB 2019⁸⁰



⁷⁹ **Populism scale:** This scale measures the degree of adherence to populism, as measured by two core beliefs: 1) that ordinary people are fundamentally good and correct and political elites are corrupt and bad; and 2) that all politics must be an expression of the will and shared desires of 'ordinary people'. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of adherence to these populism beliefs, and vice versa.


Political efficacy: This scale measures the degree to which the respondent feels they are effective in politics and processes in the country. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of efficacy political efficacy, and vice versa.

Voting efficacy: This scale measures the degree to which the respondent believes that their vote is effective in impacting politics in the country. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of voting efficacy, and vice versa.

⁸⁰ The question reads: 'Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. Please tell me if you have personally done any of these things during the past year.' Response categories include: 'No, and would never do this', 'No, but I would if I had the opportunity', 'Yes, once or twice', 'Yes, several times', 'Yes, often', and 'Yes, very often'.

Between 2013 and 2017, a combination of SARB and Afrobarometer's data showed an increase in South Africans who have used violence, or would use violence, for a political cause. The 2019 SARB, however, shows a decrease in the proportion of South Africans indicating these responses.


FIGURE 10: South Africans who have used, or will use, violence for a political cause, 2013–2019⁸¹



The rule of law

The above findings could raise questions about how South Africans feel about the country's constitutional democracy and the rule of law in general. However, most South Africans do support the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, with 76.9% agreeing that the Constitution must be upheld/respected in all circumstances. Most South Africans also agree with the rule of law as regards the authority of the police, as well as such institutions as SARS and the courts fulfilling certain functions in society. However, lack of confidence in politicians and the political elite again manifests itself, with only 54.1% agreeing with democratically elected representatives' decision-making powers.

FIGURE 11: Agreement with the rule of law, SARB 2019⁸²



⁸¹ 2013 figure from Afrobarometer. Figures for 2015, 2017 and 2019 from SARB rounds.

⁸² The question reads: 'Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements', which question is then followed by the statements in Figure 11. Response categories include 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 11), 'Neither agree nor disagree', and 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree' in Figure 11). 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis.


DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE CONTINUED

THESE FINDINGS, COUPLED WITH THOSE IN TERMS OF THE RULE OF LAW AND POLITICAL EFFICACY, POINT TO A DIRE NEED FOR TRANSPARENT, ACCOUNTABLE AND RESPONSIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.

Corruption

With 84.4% of South Africans agreeing that reconciliation is impossible as long as corruption continues in the country, sentiments pertaining to the will to combat corruption and to accountability in this regard – in particular amidst the ongoing inquiry into state capture – offer further insight into the relationship between state, the rule of law and citizens. Concerningly, eight in ten (79.3%) South Africans agree that corrupt government officials often get away with corrupt acts, while only 56% of South Africans agree that the government is effective in addressing corruption in South Africa. These findings, coupled with those in terms of the rule of law and political efficacy, point to a dire need for transparent, accountable and responsive political leadership. However, it should be noted that over half of the South African population does think government is effective in addressing corruption – perhaps given the current measures put in place around state capture.

FIGURE 12: Corruption perceptions, SARB 2019⁸³




⁸³ The question reads: 'Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements', which question is then followed by the statements in Figure 12. Response categories include 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 12), 'Neither agree nor disagree', and 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree' in Figure 12). 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis.

Political information and news


South Africans receive their political information and news predominantly from television and radio, with 43% of respondents using television for these purposes on a daily basis, and 33% using the radio for these purposes. Only 8% use social media for political information and news on a daily basis, but this does not mean social media is not a significant player in the South African landscape in terms of impact – see Figure 13.

FIGURE 13: Use of media sources for political information and news, SARB 2019⁸⁴



Television and radio are also the two most trusted sources of political information and news, with 31% of South Africans reporting that they have 'A great deal' of trust in television, and 23% reporting that they have 'a great deal' of trust in radio. Social media – the least often used – is (also) the least trusted source of information.

FIGURE 14: Trust in media sources for political information and news, SARB 2019⁸⁵




⁸⁴ The question reads: 'How often do you get information and news about politics and political issues from the following sources?'. Media sources asked about and response options are as per Figure 13.

⁸⁵ The question reads: 'How much do you trust the following sources of political information and news?' Media sources asked about and response options are as per Figure 14.

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CULTURE CONTINUED

Many South Africans do, however, feel that social media is a viable option as a democratic tool, as 48% agree that social media is effective in keeping those in power accountable, while 59% agree that social media gives ordinary people a voice. However, South Africans are reluctant for government to regulate social media, with 28% agreeing that government should be allowed to close down Internet messaging services when it believes that social media undermine political stability, and 30% agreeing that government should be allowed to close down social-media platforms for the same reason. In addition, four in ten (41%) South Africans do not agree with the government being allowed to monitor their activities on social media. Many South Africans do not regard social media as divisive, with only 30% agreeing that it is. This is of local, regional and global relevance, as many mass protests that took place during the past year in all corners of the world – from Hong Kong, to Chile, Catalonia and Lebanon – emerged on social media, rather than community meetings, as ‘leaderless rebellions’.⁸⁶ Social media pose both opportunities and challenges – opportunities in terms of democratic participation and voice, but challenges in terms of regulation, negotiation and security.

FIGURE 15: Perceptions regarding social media and society, SARB 2019⁸⁷



⁸⁶ Rachman, G., Mander, B., Domdey, D., Wong, S. and Salen, H. 2019. Leaderless rebellion: How social media enables global protests. *Financial Times*, 25 October 2019. Available online: <https://www.ft.com/content/19dc5dfe-f67b-11e9-a79c-bc9acae3b654>.

⁸⁷ The question reads: 'Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements', which question is then followed by the statements in Figure 15. Response categories include 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 15), 'Neither agree nor disagree', and 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree' in Figure 15).

IN 2019, AS IN 2017, THE SABC FEATURES AS THE INSTITUTION THAT SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE THE MOST CONFIDENCE IN. THE INTEGRITY OF THE PUBLIC BROADCASTER THUS CONTINUES TO BE AN INDISPENSABLE PART OF POLITICAL LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA, ALSO GIVEN THAT TELEVISION AND RADIO ARE THE MOST USED AND TRUSTED SOURCES OF POLITICAL INFORMATION AND NEWS.

In summary

During 2019, national elections were held, with only 66% of registered voters turning up to vote. Voter support for the incumbent ANC and for the DA as the official opposition decreased, with some smaller parties gaining support during such elections. The SARB's findings show concerningly low political and voting efficacy, particularly as they pertain to the responsiveness of elected representatives. While many South Africans adhere to beliefs that appear to fall within the populist spectrum, most still do agree that the Constitution should be upheld and respected, and, in general, support the rule of law. However, sentiments regarding a lack of consequences for corrupt government officials and the ineffectiveness of government to curb corruption further paint a picture of limited confidence in elected representatives and government officials. This is also reflected in the decrease in confidence in key state institutions from 2006 to 2019, although with some increase in confidence from 2017 to 2019 – most notably in the president, with former President Zuma in this position in 2017 and President Ramaphosa currently in the position. These findings highlight the need for responsive, transparent and accountable political leadership as an essential part of democratic political culture.

In 2019, as in 2017, the SABC features as the institution that South Africans have the most confidence in. The integrity of the public broadcaster thus continues to be an indispensable part of political life in South Africa, also given that television and radio are the most used and trusted sources of political information and news. Social media is used and trusted less for political information and news, but many South Africans do regard social media as a valuable platform for people to voice their concerns and opinions, as well as an effective accountability tool. However, there is limited appetite for any regulation of social media. Social media thus forms part of the democratic landscape of South Africa – offering its own sets of opportunities and challenges.



5 NATIONAL IDENTITY, UNITY AND NATION-BUILDING

The National Development Plan (NDP) envisions a South Africa in which South Africans will be more conscious of what they have in common, rather than of their differences. It envisions that, by 2030, South Africans' lived experiences will 'progressively undermine and cut across the divisions of race, gender, disability, space and class'. The vision also holds that citizens will be more accepting of people's multiple identities. The NDP's vision for a transformed society places unity in diversity in the foreground, advanced by a shared commitment to constitutional values. This follows from the assertion that the Constitution aims to 'transform South Africa into a more equitable, integrated and just society', and that it provides the foundation for a South African identity (as a social identity). The plan furthermore outlines its aim to create a society in which citizens are proud to be South African and live the values of the Constitution. It does, however, also caution against 'narrow nationalism', the 'dislike of others', or the development of a superiority complex in relation to people from other countries or continents.⁸⁸

Common identification with an identity may facilitate cooperative interactions and social capital.⁸⁹ In a diverse society – like South African society – the extent to which people abide by a national identity in relation to their group identity is important, as tensions and conflict between groups are more likely when group identities are perceived to be more important than national ones.⁹⁰ The negative impact of strong group identities can be compounded when inequalities and exclusions from power and resources are perceived to align with these identities.⁹¹ Group identities and inequalities then reinforce a dynamic that is to the detriment of social cohesion. However, if people put major emphasis on shared national identities, it indicates that they regard themselves as involved in a shared national project.⁹²

88 National Planning Commission (NPC). 2012. National Development Plan 2030: Our future – make it work. Available online: <https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030>.

89 Cantle, T. 2005. *Community cohesion: A new framework for race and diversity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

90 Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K. and Demarest, L. 2015. Conceptualising and measuring social cohesion in Africa: Towards a perceptions-based index. Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD), Working Paper No. 21. Available online: <http://soc.kuleuven.be/crpd/files/working-papers/wp21.pdf>.

91 Langer, A. & Smedts, K. 2013. Seeing is not believing: Perceptions of horizontal inequalities in Africa. CRPD Working Paper No. 16. Leuven: CRPD; Stewart, F. 2002. Horizontal inequalities: A neglected dimension of development. QEH Working Paper Series No. 81. Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.

92 Meiring, T. and Potgieter, E. 2017. Towards a Social Cohesion Index for South Africa using SARB data. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). Working Paper 1, Reconciliation and Development Series. Available online: <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/towards-a-social-cohesion-index-for-south-africa-using-sarb-data/?portfolioCats=49>.

NATIONAL IDENTITY, UNITY AND NATION-BUILDING CONTINUED


OPTIMISM IN TERMS OF WANTING, AND BELIEVING IN, THE POSSIBILITY OF UNITY IS NOT UNIQUE TO THE 2019 SARB, BUT RATHER TO SENTIMENTS PERSISTING SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE SARB IN 2003.

As mentioned, the South African Reconciliation Barometer's (SARB) methodology posits that reconciliation is more likely to thrive in a society where there is a growing democratic political culture. One aspect of democratic political culture that the SARB considers is whether citizens feel part of an inclusive nation. In this regard, the SARB pays attention to sentiments pertaining to a national identity, feelings regarding unity or division, as well as nation-building.

National unity and identity

The 2019 SARB shows that a vast majority of respondents are proudly South African, with 81.6% agreeing that they want their children to think of themselves as South African, 80.5% reporting that being South African is an important part of how they see themselves, and 79.7% agreeing that people should regard themselves as South Africans first. In addition, most respondents support unity, with 77.7% of South Africans stating that they want unity, and 71.4% agreeing that a united South Africa is possible. Seven in ten (69.9%) South Africans furthermore agree that, despite differences, there is more that unites South Africans than keeps them apart.


FIGURE 16: Perceptions regarding national unity and identity, SARB 2019⁹³



Optimism in terms of wanting, and believing in, the possibility of unity is not unique to the 2019 SARB, but rather to sentiments persisting since the beginning of the SARB in 2003. Both questions, however, reached a high point in terms of percentage agreement in 2019 – a notable recovery after agreement dipped to 55% and 53.5%, respectively, in 2013.

⁹³ The question reads: 'Thinking about yourself as a South African, please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements'. Statements as per Figure 16, with response options including: 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 16), 'Neither agree nor disagree', and 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree' in Figure 16). 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis.

FIGURE 17: South Africans agreeing with the desirability and possibility of unity, SARB 2003–2019⁹⁴



National symbolism

Echoing the ‘proudly South African’ sentiments that we have reported on above are the positive connotations most South Africans attach to the current South African flag. Thirty-three per cent of South Africans opted for the response option ‘proud’ to reflect how they feel about the current South African flag, while 26.8% reported that the flag makes them feel free, and 12.9% reported that the flag makes them feel like they belong.

Table 4: South Africans’ reported associations with the current South African flag, SARB 2019⁹⁵

	Percentage of South Africans who report that the current South African flag makes them feel ... (First response)
Proud	33.0
Free	26.8
Belonging	12.9
Indifferent	4.5
Optimistic	4.4
Disappointed	3.9
Don't know*	3.0
Oppressed	1.9
Bitter	1.5
Patriotic	1.4
Angry	1.4
Fearful	1.3
Refused a response*	1.3
Other responses*	1.2
Discriminated against	1.0

* Refers to response options not read out in interview.

In contrast, first-response associations with the old flag were predominantly negative, with 17.1% of South Africans reporting that the flag makes them feel oppressed, 12.4% reporting that it makes them feel discriminated against, 10.6% reporting that it makes them feel angry, and 10.4% indicating that it makes them feel bitter.

⁹⁴ Questions phrased as per Figure 16. ‘Strongly agree’ and ‘Agree’ responses combined to form ‘Agree’ for both question items.

⁹⁵ Respondents were shown the current South African flag and then asked to indicate the word which most closely resembled how this image made them feel. First and second mentions were asked for. Response options are as per Table 4.


NATIONAL IDENTITY, UNITY AND NATION-BUILDING CONTINUED

Table 5: South Africans' reported associations with the old South African flag, SARB 2019 ⁹⁶	
	Percentage of South Africans who report that the old South African flag makes them feel ... (first response)
Oppressed	17.1
Discriminated against	12.4
Angry	10.6
Bitter	10.4
Do not know*	9.4
Indifferent	9.1
Proud	7.5
Fearful	6.0
Refused*	5.1
Free	4.4
Belonging	3.7
Nostalgic	2.0
Patriotic	1.7
Other specify*	0.7

* Refers to response options not read out in interview.

Most South Africans also agree that the old South African flag should be banned, although a third of South Africans do not agree, or neither agree nor disagree with the banning of the old flag.

FIGURE 18: Banning of the old South African flag, SARB 2019 ⁹⁷



Sources of division

Most South Africans report that they want unity, and think it is possible. What, however, keeps South Africans apart if the general sentiment in support of unity holds? The SARB asks respondents what they think is the primary source of division in society. Respondents then choose from a list of response options and are asked for a first and second response. This year, as in 2017 and most SARB rounds since 2003,⁹⁸ inequality is ranked as the greatest source of division on first mention, as well as combined mentions.

⁹⁶ Respondents were asked if they wanted to see the old South African flag first. Those who did were shown the old South African flag; those who did not were not shown the image. All respondents were then asked to indicate the word which most closely resembles how the old South African flag makes them feel. First and second mentions were asked for. Response options are as per Table 5.

⁹⁷ The question reads: 'Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree that the old South African flag should be banned.' Response options included: 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree'), 'Neither agree nor disagree', and 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree').

⁹⁸ Potgieter, E. 2017. SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey: 2017 Report. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). Available online: www.ijr.org.za.

MOST SOUTH AFRICANS ALSO WANT UNITY, AND THINK IT IS POSSIBLE – THIS YEAR REVEALING THE GREATEST OPTIMISM IN THIS REGARD SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE SARB. THESE FINDINGS BODE WELL IN TERMS OF BUILDING COHESION AMONG SOUTH AFRICANS.

Race, as in 2017, ranks second this year, and political parties third. These findings are not surprising, in particular considering that many South Africans highlighted similar challenges with progress in reconciliation processes, as well as given the socio-economic challenges faced by many South Africans in a highly unequal society.

Table 6: Sources of division, SARB 2019 ⁹⁹

	First	Second	Combined
Inequality	33.0	23.4	56.4
Race	24.4	25.2	49.6
Political parties	15.8	22.3	38.1
Language	11.1	16.2	27.2
Infectious diseases	6.3	9.1	15.4
None	4.7	2.2	6.9
Other	0.4	0.2	0.6
Don't know/refused	4.2	1.4	5.7

In summary

A vast majority of South Africans are proud to be South African and associate positively with national symbols such as the current South African flag. Most South Africans also want unity, and think it is possible – this year revealing the greatest optimism in this regard since the inception of the SARB. These findings bode well in terms of building cohesion among South Africans. However, challenges to these hopes persist in the form of historical confrontation – such as with the banning of the old South African flag – and pervasive sources of division, such as inequality, and differences between people from different race groups and political parties. It should also be kept in mind that support for a national identity should not again be to the exclusion of ‘others’, with negative attitudes to people from other countries living in South Africa presenting its own challenges (see Section 8).

99 The question reads: ‘People sometimes talk about the division between people in South Africa. Sometimes these divisions cause people to be left out or discriminated against. In other instances it can lead to anger or even violence between groups. What, in your experience, is the biggest division in South Africa today?’ Response categories include: The division between supporters of different political parties (‘Political parties’), the division between rich and poor (‘Inequality’), the division between those living with infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, TB, etc.) and the rest of the community (‘Disease’), the division between South Africans of different race groups (black, white, Coloured and Indian) (‘Race’), the division between South Africans of different language groups (‘Language’), ‘None’ or ‘Other’. ‘Don’t know/refused’ were included in the data.



APARTHEID LEGACY AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE


The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) posits that, in order for reconciliation to take root in South Africa, it is necessary to acknowledge and deal with the legacy of direct, structural and symbolic violence and oppression suffered under apartheid, and to support initiatives for redressing this legacy. This is measured through indicators that consider the extent to which South Africans acknowledge the injustice of apartheid, acknowledge the legacy of apartheid, and support redress and transformation. Essentially, knowing what historical past South Africa is reconciling and uniting from is important as part of these processes. In addition, the SARB postulates that, for reconciliation to advance, it is important for citizens to perceive positive change within society. This is measured by asking South Africans whether they think various aspects of South Africa have improved or worsened since 1994 – when South Africa became a democracy.

Historical confrontation and apartheid legacies

Figure 19 shows that a majority of South Africans acknowledge the injustices of apartheid. More than eight in ten (83.2%) South Africans agree that apartheid was a crime against humanity and that the apartheid government committed terrible crimes against those struggling against apartheid (80.2%). More than three-quarters (78.5%) of South Africans agree that black South Africans suffered violence because of their race during apartheid, and 76.7% agree that black people were deprived of quality education under the apartheid government. Three-quarters (75.9%) of South Africans also agree that black South Africans were deprived of earning proper livelihoods, and 74.2% agree that the apartheid government oppressed the majority of South Africans. One in ten, or less, South Africans disagree with these statements, thus showing general agreement that apartheid was a system which violated the human and civil rights of various oppressed groups


APARTHEID LEGACY AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE CONTINUED

FIGURE 19: Historical confrontation, SARB 2019¹⁰⁰



A majority of South Africans also perceive that there are lasting effects of apartheid in South Africa today, as shown by Figure 20. Just over seven in ten (73.5%) South Africans agree that residential areas in South Africa are still racially segregated because of the lasting effects of apartheid, while 74.4% agree that little progress has been made in returning land to people who were evicted under apartheid laws – showing the perceived continued impact of apartheid spatial segregation today. These sentiments also reflect in the percentage of South Africans who agree that many black South Africans do not own land/property because of the lasting effects of apartheid (75.8%), with 79.2% agreeing with the statement that many white South Africans own land/property today because of the lasting effects of apartheid. Finally, in terms of lasting impacts pertaining to inequality, three-quarters (75.8%) of South Africans agree that many black South Africans are still poor today because of the lasting effects of apartheid, while almost eight in ten (77.7%) South Africans agree that many white South Africans are still well off today due to apartheid's effects.

FIGURE 20: Apartheid legacies, SARB 2019



100 The question reads: "How much do you agree with the following statements about the lasting effects of apartheid in SA today?" Statements as per Figure 20. Response categories included 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 19), 'Neither agree nor disagree', and 'Disagree' and 'Strongly disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree' in Figure 19).

Using both sets of questions, two composite scales were constructed. The first scale, measuring views on apartheid, was scored such that higher scores between 1 and 5 indicated greater agreement with the belief that apartheid constituted a human rights violation. The second scale, measuring views on the legacy of apartheid, also scored such that higher scores between 1 and 5 measured the degree of agreement with the belief that South Africa's current society is still impacted by apartheid. Table 7 shows the mean scores for both scales for historically defined race groups, as well as South Africa as a whole. The mean score for white respondents is lower than any of the other groups, showing lesser agreement among respondents in this group with both beliefs about apartheid as a human rights violation and its enduring legacy on contemporary society, while the mean scores for Black African respondents are higher than the South African scores – showing a greater agreement in terms of both apartheid acknowledgement and legacy among respondents in this group.

Table 7: Mean scores – apartheid acknowledgement and apartheid legacy scales¹⁰¹

	Apartheid views scale	Apartheid legacy scale
Black	4.2	4.2
White	3.4	3.1
Indian/Asian	4.0	4.1
Coloured	4.0	3.9
South Africa	4.1	4.0

Transformation

In an effort to redress the imbalances of the past, the post-apartheid state prioritised a policy of 'positive discrimination' in terms of which those who were neglected under apartheid would receive preferential treatment in various sectors.¹⁰² Beneficiaries of representative affirmative action policies are identified as 'persons with disabilities, women and Black people in relation to public service composition, and the poor with regard to public service provisioning.'¹⁰³ In order to measure and conceptualise progress regarding 'representation' and 'transformation', post-apartheid South Africa thus continues to use the very same racial categories as apartheid South Africa, raising the key question: 'How does one recognise race and its continued effects on people's everyday lives in an attempt to work against racial inequality, while at the same time working against practices that perpetuate race thinking?'¹⁰⁴ A disjuncture in opinion is apparent from the SARB's data. In this year's SARB, and in previous years, agreement on the necessity for a racially representative workforce is evident, but also that South Africans are still divided on the continued use of race categories to measure transformation (see Figure 22).¹⁰⁵ In other words, while South Africans see the general need for a racially representative workforce, some are against the idea of measuring transformation using race categories. In the 2019 SARB, this is also evident from the 72.8% of South Africans who agree that reconciliation is impossible as long as we use racial categories to measure transformation, while 75%

101 **Apartheid views:** This scale measures the degree of agreement that the legacy of apartheid has impeded current development and improvement in people's lives. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of agreement that the legacy of apartheid persists and impacts current society and development, and vice versa.

Apartheid legacy: This scale measures the degree of agreement that apartheid was a system which violated the human and civil rights of various oppressed groups. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of agreement that apartheid violated human and civil rights, and vice versa.

102 Cameron, R. and Milne, C. 2011. Representative bureaucracy in the South African public services. *African Journal of Public Affairs*, 4(2):18–35.

103 Republic of South Africa. 1997. A conceptual paper for affirmative action and the management of diversity in the public service. Green Paper No. 851 of 1997. Pretoria: Department of Public Services and Administration, Chapter. 3.1.


104 Erasmus, Z. 2010. Confronting the categories: Equitable admissions without apartheid race classification. *South African Journal of Higher Education*, 24(2):245–246.

105 Potgieter, E. and Moosa, M. 2018. More than a space for interracial contact: Exploring the importance of the workplace for social cohesion and reconciliation in South Africa. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), Reconciliation and Development Series Report No. 1. Available online: http://www.ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/IJR_R1-More-than-a-space-for-interracial-contact-final.pdf.

APARTHEID LEGACY AND PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGE CONTINUED


of South Africans agree that making workplaces representative of all races should be a national priority. Seven in ten South Africans also agree that workplaces should be representative in terms of gender, and in terms of ability. There thus seems to be support for formal equality, but less agreement regarding substantial equality – or how to get there.

FIGURE 21: Sentiments pertaining to employment equity, SARB 2019¹⁰⁶



Agreement with employment equity in terms of race dipped from 70.7% in 2007 to 57.7% in 2012, from there rising to 75.3% in 2019. Both agreement with representation in terms of gender and ability also dipped to their lowest levels around 2012 and 2013, then increasing again to 69.7% and 70.3% in 2019. Although agreement in this regard was higher than for representation in terms of race in certain years, representation in terms of race received the greatest proportion of agreement since 2015.

FIGURE 22: Agreement on representative workforce in terms of race, gender and (dis)ability, and retention of race categories to measure progress, SARB 2007–2019¹⁰⁷




106 The question asked whether it should be a national priority to make the workforces of South African institutions representative of all races/gender/in terms of (dis)ability. Responses categories included: 'Strongly agree' and 'Agree' (combined to form 'Agree' in Figure 21), 'Neither agree nor disagree', and 'Strongly disagree' and 'Disagree' (combined to form 'Disagree' in Figure 21). 'Don't know' was not read out as a response category. 'Don't know' responses were included in the data analysis.

107 As with note 106. Only 'Agree' shown in Figure 22. Some years had 'Uncertain' or 'Neutral' in the place of 'Neither agree nor disagree'.

Change since 1994

In terms of perceptions of change since 1994, the SARB asked respondents whether they thought certain aspects of society had improved, worsened or stayed the same. Figure 23 shows that, in 2019, about four in ten (38.5%) South Africans reported that race relations had improved since 1994, while less than a third (31.5%) indicated that they thought their personal safety had improved since 1994. Less than three in ten South Africans reported that they thought there had been an improvement in respect of inequality, employment and corruption since 1994 – all aspects that presented challenges under apartheid, and for many continue to present challenges. Notably, almost half of the South African population (48.8%) reported that corruption had worsened since 1994. Although corruption was also rampant under apartheid, the recent prominence of corruption cases in South Africa (ranging from those in the private sector, with the Steinhoff saga as an example) to those regarding the state (with the Zondo Commission revelations most currently in the public eye) seems to be taking its toll in many ways on South Africans' perceptions and experiences in society – both in terms of perceived change since 1994 and in terms of limiting progress with reconciliation and affecting democratic political culture.

FIGURE 23: Perceptions of improvement in, or worsening of, aspects of society, SARB 2019¹⁰⁸



From these question items, a composite scale was constructed, scored such that higher scores between 1 and 5 indicate greater perceived improvement since 1994. Table 8 shows that the mean score for black African respondents is higher in comparison with other historically defined groups, indicating greater perceived improvement among respondents in this group than in the other groups. The mean scores for white and Coloured respondents are lower than for black African respondents and Indian/Asian respondents, as well as for South Africa as a whole, showing a lesser perceived improvement since 1994 among respondents from these groups. The mean score for the age group 18 to 24 years is higher than for any other group – showing a greater perceived improvement since 1994 among respondents in this group. As age groups progressively get older, the mean score decreases, showing lesser perceived improvement among respondents in older age groups. Those aged 18 to 24 were born after apartheid, meaning their responses are based on formal and informal education about apartheid and life under apartheid.

¹⁰⁸ The question reads: 'How would you say the following have changed since 1994, when the country became a democracy?' Statements include: Your personal safety and that of your family (Safety); Economic circumstances for you and your family (Economic circumstances); Employment opportunities for you and your family (Employment opportunities); Relations between members of different race groups (Race relations); The gap between rich and poor (Inequality); Levels of corruption in the country (Corruption). Response options included: 'Worsened a great deal' and 'Worsened somewhat' (combined to form 'Worsened'), 'Stayed the same', and 'Improved somewhat' and 'Improved a great deal' (combined to form 'Improved').



THE 2019 SARB SHOWS THAT MOST SOUTH AFRICANS ACKNOWLEDGE BOTH THE VIOLATIONS OF RIGHTS UNDER APARTHEID AND THE PERSISTENT LEGACIES OF APARTHEID TODAY.

Table 8: Mean scores – change since 1994, SARB 2019¹⁰⁹

	Change-since-1994 scale: Higher scores mean greater perceived improvement since 1994
Black	2.9
White	2.4
Indian/Asian	2.6
Coloured	2.4
18-24 years	3.0
25-34 years	2.9
35-49 years	2.8
50-59 years	2.6
60+	2.5
South Africa	2.8

In summary

The SARB investigates perceptions pertaining to how people remember apartheid, as well as whether they acknowledge the legacies of apartheid and how it impacts South African lives today. Processes such as creating unity and reconciliation require that a society also understand and remember its divided past in order to create a different future. It is also important that South Africans experience positive change as part of changes from their divided past to a more united future that so many South Africans agree they want. The 2019 SARB shows that most South Africans acknowledge both the violations of rights under apartheid and the persistent legacies of apartheid today. However, among white respondents – those who were not oppressed under apartheid – the extent of acknowledgement in this regard is less than for other historically defined race groups, showing that memory and truth work as part of reconciliation need to continue. Most South Africans support employment equity, that is, a nationally representative workforce in terms of race, gender and ability, but some disjuncture in terms of using historical race categories for measuring transformation arises from the SARB's data. In terms of perceived change since 1994, from the list of societal aspects inquired into, the aspect that the greatest proportion of respondents reported had improved was race relations, while the aspect that the smallest proportion of respondents reported had improved was the situation in respect of corruption. Compared with other historically defined race groups, black African respondents reported the greatest extent of improvement since 1994. Interestingly, younger age groups reported a greater extent of improvement since 1994 than older generations. Of particular interest is that those who were not born under apartheid reported the most improvement since 1994 when compared with other age groups.

¹⁰⁹ This scale measures the degree of improvement experienced since 1994 at a personal, economic and broader societal level. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating a worsening of the situation since 1994 and 5 indicating great improvement since 1994.



SOCIO-ECONOMIC INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) posits that unjust/unequal power relations between different social groups (e.g. race/class) hinder progress towards reconciliation. More just and equitable power relations would create a more fertile environment for reconciliation. The SARB measures perceptions related to this by asking about access to economic, social, cultural and spatial resources within society. Certain sub-indicators are used, each of which demonstrates differential perceptions of access to realms of power in society.

Perceptions of exclusion and inequality – political, cultural, social and economic – provide insight into the social distances between individual members and groups within a society.¹¹⁰ People's perceptions of being in an equal or unequal society are said to impact upon societal cohesion, providing clarity on two underlying sentiments assumed to be important for a cohesive society: 1) the recognition of interdependence among broader society, and feelings of being engaged in a shared enterprise; and 2) perceptions of fairness in the distribution of power and resources.¹¹¹

The SARB's indicators relating to power dynamics in society include the Lived Poverty Index (LPI) to measure lived experiences of poverty, social mobility to measure South Africans' perceived opportunities, as well as relative economic standing. The SARB also considers perceived political and economic power, as well as perceived group power.

110 Bourdieu, P. 1984. *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*. London: Routledge; Wilkinson, R.G. and Pickett, K.G. 2010. *The spirit level* 1st ed. London: Penguin, Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 12; Rohstein, B. and Uslaner, E.M. (fn. 14), 41–72; Uslaner, E.M. 2002. *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Uslaner, E.M. and Brown, M. 2005. Inequality, trust, and civic engagement. *American Politics Research*, 33(6): 868–894.

111 Meiring, T. and Potgieter, E. 2017. Towards a Social Cohesion Index for South Africa using SARB data. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). Working Paper 1, Reconciliation and Development Series. Available online: <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/towards-a-social-cohesion-index-for-south-africa-using-sarb-data/?portfolioCats=49>.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CONTINUED

THE MEAN SCORE FOR FEMALE RESPONDENTS IS HIGHER THAN THAT FOR MALE RESPONDENTS, INDICATING GREATER REPORTED LIVED POVERTY AMONG FEMALE SOUTH AFRICANS.

Lived poverty

The LPI comprises a series of survey questions that measure how frequently people do not have access to basic necessities during the course of a year. Offering an important complement to official statistics on poverty and development, this measure provides additional insight into lived poverty experiences based on respondents' experiences and interests. The question asked by the LPI is:

Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or your family gone without enough: food to eat; clean water for home use; medicines or medical treatment; enough fuel to cook your food; a cash income?

Response categories include: *never, just once or twice, several times, many times and always.*¹¹²

A scale was constructed using responses to these questions, with scores from 1 to 5. Lower scores indicate less lived poverty, and higher scores indicate more lived poverty. Table 9 shows that, as can be expected, lower SEM groups have higher LPI mean scores, indicating more lived poverty among these groups in comparison with higher SEM groups. The mean score for female respondents is higher than that for male respondents, indicating greater reported lived poverty among female South Africans – to be expected given Statistics South Africa's (StatsSA) findings regarding women living in poverty, as mentioned earlier. The mean score for white respondents is lower than for any of the other historically defined race groups, indicating less lived poverty among white respondents, while the mean score for black African respondents is higher than for any of the other groups, showing greater lived poverty among respondents in this group. The Western Cape has the lowest LPI mean score of all the provinces, indicating less lived poverty in this province than in other provinces, while the Eastern Cape, Limpopo and North West's mean scores are above the South African mean score, indicating greater lived poverty in these provinces. The non-metro LPI mean score is higher than that of the metro LPI mean score, indicating greater lived poverty among non-metro respondents than metro respondents. Finally, in terms of age groups, the mean score for respondents 25 to 34 years of age shows greater lived poverty in this group than in other age groups.

112 Mattes, R., Dulani, B. and Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2016. Africa's growth dividend? Lived poverty drops across much of the continent. Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 29, January 2016. Available online: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaperno29_lived_poverty_declines_in_africa_eng.pdf.

Table 9: Lived Poverty Index mean scores, SARB 2019¹¹³

Group	Mean
South Africa	1.9
SEM (SEM 1 to SEM 10)	
SEM 1 (0-10)	2.4
SEM 2 (11-20)	2.4
SEM 3 (21-30)	2.2
SEM 4 (31-40)	2.0
SEM 5 (41-50)	1.9
SEM 6 (51-60)	1.8
SEM 7 (61-70)	1.8
SEM 8 (71-80)	1.4
SEM 9 (81-90)	1.4
SEM 10 (91-100)	1.1
Male	1.9
Female	2.0
Black	2.0
White	1.2
Indian/Asian	1.3
Coloured	1.6
Western Cape	1.5
Eastern Cape	2.1
Free State	1.8
KwaZulu-Natal	1.9
Gauteng	1.9
Northern Cape	1.7
North West	2.0
Mpumalanga	1.8
Limpopo	2.3
18-24 years	1.9
25-34 years	2.0
35-49 years	1.9
50-59 years	1.9
60+	1.7
Metro	1.8
Non-metro	2.0

Social mobility

Socio-economic inequality is not only about unequal outcomes, but also about opportunities – or social mobility. Social mobility (often also seen as equality of opportunity) can be defined as the capacity of an individual to achieve a better economic and/or social position for himself or herself (and his or her family) through hard work.¹¹⁴ Starting points matter in the pursuit of equal outcomes; therefore, access to

113 This scale measures the degree of poverty/deprivation experienced by the respondents and their households. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of poverty/deprivation, and vice versa.

114 Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K. 2009. Social mobility: Unequal opportunities. In: *The spirit level: Why equality is better for everyone*. London: Penguin Books.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CONTINUED

resources, services and opportunities is an important determinant of the extent to which people can fulfil their own potential.¹¹⁵ Indicators used to measure social mobility include occupational measures to evaluate intergenerational mobility (often used by sociologists), as well as earnings and income (often used by economists) – all with their own strengths and challenges.¹¹⁶

The SARB investigates perceptions regarding social mobility. The 2015–2019 SARB surveys asked respondents to consider the goals they had in their own lives, and whether they felt that they had access to (a) the financial resources, (b) the groups of people, (c) the education, and (d) the mobility to achieve these goals. The 2017 and 2019 SARB considered whether South Africans felt that they had access to these more tangible resources that they needed to realise their goals, as well as to internal resources. In this regard, the concept ‘locus of control of reinforcement’ (hereafter simply referred to as ‘locus of control’) is applied. ‘Locus of control’ can be defined as ‘the attitudes and behaviour people adopt in life according to their perception of what determines whether or not they receive reinforcement in life.’¹¹⁷ In other words, it is the extent to which a person believes that he or she has control over the positive and negative outcomes in life.¹¹⁸ For the purposes of the 2017 and 2019 SARB, this concept is applied to understand whether South Africans believe they have the internal reinforcements to reach their goals – in particular, whether they feel that they have the self-confidence and the self-determination that they need to achieve such goals. The resources the SARB asks about are by no means an exhaustive list of obstacles or aids to social mobility, but they do offer insights into perceived access and advantages pertaining to key aspects of social mobility.

It is important to note that the SARB’s questions relating to social mobility refer to self-identified goals. This allows for individuals’ own ambitions (or non-ambitions), and not only economic indicators, to determine the extent to, and reasons for, which certain resources are required. Perceived access to financial resources and groups of people (i.e. social capital), in particular, does not mean that respondents already have the resources they require, but rather that respondents believe that they can access those resources when they are required to do so. However, respondents’ perceptions of having the education and the ability to access physical spaces capture whether respondents believe they already have (or do not have) certain advantages on the way to achieving their goals.

Figure 24 shows that self-esteem and personal efficacy do not deter most South Africans, with 66% and 70.6% of South Africans agreeing that they have the self-confidence and self-determination they need to reach their personal goals. However, only 44.7% and 45.3% of South Africans agree that they have access to the financial and social capital resources they need. And around half of South Africans – 49.8% and 51.3%, respectively – agree that they have access to the transport and education they need to achieve the goals that they have in their own lives. This shows a greater perceived need for external resources, rather than internal resources, to pursue personal goals.


115 UNDESA (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs). 2015. Inequality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Development Issues No. 4, 21 October 2015. Available online: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/wess_dev_issues/dsp_policy_04.pdf.

116 Torche, F. 2013. How do we characteristically measure and analyze intergenerational mobility? Paper presented at the Social Mobility Workshop. 10 June 2013, Committee on Population, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. Available online: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c94b/c9d0a9eca21477120105bc83cd8575a4d56a.pdf>.

117 Rotter, J.B. 1966. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied*, 80(1):1–28.

118 Stander, G. 2014. Class, race and locus of control in democratic South Africa. Dissertation presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University. Available online: <http://scholar.sun.ac.za>.

FIGURE 24: Self-perceived access to resources, and personal efficacy, SARB 2019



From these question items, a scale was constructed with scores from 1 to 5. Higher scores mean greater perceived personal efficacy and esteem. Table 10 shows a higher mean score for male respondents, indicating greater personal efficacy among respondents in this group in comparison with female respondents. The mean score for white respondents is higher than for any other historically defined race group, showing greater personal efficacy among respondents in this group, whereas the mean score for Coloured respondents is lower than for any of the other historically defined race groups, thus showing less perceived personal efficacy among respondents in this group. The mean scores for older age groups – both the 50–59 and 60+ age groups – are lower in comparison with other age groups, showing lower personal efficacy and esteem among respondents in these groups. Finally, the mean score for respondents in metro areas is lower than for non-metro respondents, showing greater personal efficacy and esteem among non-metro respondents.

Table 10: Mean scores – self-perceived social mobility, SARB 2019¹¹⁹

Group	Mean
South Africa	3.4
Male	3.4
Female	3.3
Black	3.3
White	3.6
Indian/Asian	3.4
Coloured	3.2
18–24 years	3.5
25–34 years	3.4
35–49 years	3.4
50–59 years	3.2
60+	3.2
Metro	3.3
Non-metro	3.4

¹¹⁹ This scale measures the respondents' degree of belief in their individual capability to achieve their life goals and ambitions. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of individual capability and esteem, and vice versa.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CONTINUED

THE GENERAL FINDING FROM SUCH STUDIES IS THAT, ALTHOUGH ABSOLUTE INCOME LEVELS HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY, HOW PEOPLE RANK THEMSELVES IN RELATION TO OTHERS HAS A MORE IMPORTANT IMPACT ON SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING.

Relative standing

‘Relative standing’ refers to ‘where one fits into the distribution of economic welfare’. This can be measured by income, wealth or perceptions of relative financial welfare. Measures of relative standing – and relative income, more specifically – are often studied in relation to self-reported happiness or subjective well-being.¹²⁰ The general finding from such studies is that, although absolute income levels have a role to play, how people rank themselves in relation to others has a more important impact on subjective well-being. In this regard, individuals’ subjective well-being diminishes due to the higher income of reference groups, and the accompanying sense of relative deprivation or reduced status.¹²¹


To gauge South Africans’ self-perceived social standing and access to economic resources, the SARB 2019 asked respondents a series of questions about their subjective experience of their own household conditions and financial situation in relation to others in their community, but also the rest of South Africa. They were also asked how these circumstances compare with what they were in the past, and how they expect them to be in the future.

In terms of household conditions, 30.1% of South Africans reported that they were better off than their community, with 45.1% reporting that they felt they had the same household conditions as the rest of their community. In relation to the rest of South Africa, 26% of South Africans reported that they were better off, while 40.4% felt that their household conditions were the same as the rest of South Africa. Just over a third (35.5%) of South Africans reported that they were better off than their parents – indicating perceived intergenerational mobility in terms of household living conditions among these respondents. Four in ten (40.7%) South Africans reported that they thought their household living conditions would improve in future.

120 Easterlin, R. 1995. Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all? *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 27(1):35–47; Kingdon, G.G. and Knight, J. 2007. Community, comparisons and subjective well-being in a divided society. *Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization*, 64:69–90.


121 Meiring, T., Kannemeyer, C. and Potgieter, E. 2018. The gap between rich and poor: South African society’s biggest divide depends on where you think you fit in. IJR Reconciliation and Development Series, Working Paper No. 4. Available online: http://www.ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/IJR_WP4-Gap-between-rich-and-poor-Final.pdf.

FIGURE 25: Relative standing in terms of household conditions, SARB 2019¹²²




Slightly less South Africans shared this optimism in relation to their financial circumstances, with 38.2% reporting that their financial circumstances were likely to improve, and about a third (32.6%) reporting that their current circumstances were an improvement from the recent past. A third of South Africans (33.8%) reported that they were better off in terms of financial circumstances than their parents, while a quarter (25.2%) felt better off than the rest of South Africa and 28.5% felt better off than the rest of their community. In general, responses in terms of financial circumstances were less optimistic than in terms of household living conditions.

FIGURE 26: Relative standing in terms of financial circumstances, SARB 2019¹²³



122 The question reads: 'Thinking again about these household living conditions of you and your family as we have just discussed (having enough food, water, medicine, cooking fuel, income and electricity): How would you regard your situation when compared with others?' Household living conditions referred to here are the items included in the LPI. Response categories include: 'Much worse' and 'Worse' (combined to form 'Worse' in Figure 25), 'The same', and 'Better' and 'Much better' (combined to form 'Better' in Figure 25). 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis. Statements are: 'In relation to the rest of the community where you live, your household conditions are... (Community); In relation to the rest of South Africa, your household conditions are... (South Africa); In relation to your parents, your household conditions are... (Parents); How do these living conditions of you and your family compare with what they were like 2 to 3 years ago? (Past); How are these living conditions of you and your family likely to change in the NEXT 2 to 3 years? Will they get... (Future prospects).'


123 The question reads: 'Think about the financial situation of you and your family. By "financial situation" we mean, for example, you and your family income, cash available, savings, expenses, debt. How would you regard your situation when compared with others?' Response categories include: 'Much worse' and 'Worse' (combined to form 'Worse' in Figure 26), 'The same', and 'Better' and 'Much better' (combined to form 'Better' in Figure 26). 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis. Statements are: 'In relation to the rest of the community where you live, your financial situation is... (Community); In relation to the rest of South Africa, your financial situation is... (South Africa); In relation to your parents, your financial situation is... (Parents); How does your financial situation and that of your family compare with what it was like 2 to 3 years ago? Is it...? (Past); How is your financial situation and that of your family likely to change in the 2 to 3 years? Will it get...? (Future prospects).'



Perceived political and economic power

The SARB also considers whether South Africans are satisfied with the political and economic power they think they have. Almost half of South Africans are dissatisfied with the economic power they think they have, while 44% are dissatisfied with the political power they think they have.

FIGURE 27: (Dis)satisfaction with perceived personal economic and political power, SARB 2019¹²⁴



In summary

Access or the absence thereof impact social cohesion and reconciliation processes. The SARB includes various indicators to consider perceived economic, social and spatial access. The 2019 SARB shows that – as can be expected from the StatsSA findings regarding poverty – female respondents reported greater lived poverty in comparison with male respondents, black African respondents reported greater lived poverty in comparison with other historically defined race groups, and those living in non-metro spaces reported greater lived poverty in comparison with metro respondents. In terms of social mobility – equality of opportunities – the 2019 SARB data shows that most South Africans report having the self-confidence and self-determination to achieve their personal goals. However, many reported not having access to the financial resource, social capital, education and transport they need to realise their personal goals. About a third of South Africans reported intergenerational mobility in terms of household living conditions and/or financial circumstances, while about four in ten South Africans remain optimistic that these circumstances will improve in the near future. At the same time, 48% of South Africans are dissatisfied with their self-perceived economic power, and 44% of South Africans are dissatisfied with their self-perceived political power – indicating a sense of disempowerment for almost half of the South African population.

¹²⁴ The question reads: 'How do you feel about the amount of economic and political power that you personally have?' Response options included: 'Very dissatisfied' and 'Dissatisfied' (combined to form 'Dissatisfied' in Figure 27), 'Neutral', and 'Satisfied' and 'Very satisfied' (combined to form 'Satisfied' in figure 27). 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis.



INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND RELATIONS

8

Interpersonal trust


Trust can be seen as an indicator of the 'glue' that binds a society together, serving as the foundation of the relationships needed to overcome tensions and create an environment favourable to sustainable ties within a society.¹²⁵ As mentioned before, three levels of trust that play a role as part of society's overall cohesiveness can be distinguished: bonding trust between people in the same group, bridging trust between different groups, and linking trust between society (with its respective groups) and institutions, most notably the state. The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) investigates intergroup trust as part of democratic political culture in order to understand the levels and types of bridging and bonding trust in society.

The findings presented in Figure 28 show that more bonding, rather than bridging, trust is present in South African society. A greater proportion of South Africans trust their relatives than any other groups, with almost two-thirds (62.9%) of South Africans stating that they trust their relatives 'A great deal' or 'Quite a lot'. Many South Africans also trust their neighbours, with 45.5% of South Africans reporting they trust their neighbours 'Quite a lot' or 'A great deal'. At the other end, only one in five South Africans trust people from other countries living here – with 20.1% trusting people from other African countries, and 22.2% trusting people from other countries, but not African countries, living here 'Quite a lot' or 'A great deal'. From figure 28, a few themes arise – here further elaborated on is that of racial reconciliation and xenophobia.

125 Meiring, T. and Potgieter, E. 2017. Towards a Social Cohesion Index for South Africa using SARB data. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). Working Paper 1, Reconciliation and Development Series. Available online: <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/towards-a-social-cohesion-index-for-south-africa-using-sarb-data/?portfolioCats=49>.

INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND RELATIONS CONTINUED

FIGURE 28: Interpersonal trust, SARB 2019¹²⁶



Racial reconciliation


About three in ten (27.1%) South Africans report that they trust people from 'other race groups'. At the same time, two-thirds (66.4%) of South Africans indicated that reconciliation is impossible as long as racism remains unaddressed in our society, while about four in ten (38.5%) South Africans reported that race relations had improved in South Africa since 1994. The SARB posits that progress towards reconciliation cannot take place without the opportunities and willingness to engage in meaningful connection between different race groups in South Africa.

The SARB asks respondents how often they interact with people from 'other race groups' on a daily basis in various spaces. South Africans interact the least with people from 'other race groups' at home, with four in ten (39.5%) South Africans reporting that they never interact with people from other race groups at home. A quarter (25.5%) of South Africans never interact with people from other race groups at work, although this is the space with the greatest extent of interaction, with a quarter (24.0%) reporting that they often or always interact with people from other race groups at work/a place of study. Another sphere of frequent interaction is commercial domains, with 22.2% of South Africans reporting that they often or always interact with people from other race groups on a daily basis in these spaces.

126 Question reads: How much do you trust the following groups of people? Statements and response options as per Figure 28.

THE SARB POSITS THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS RECONCILIATION CANNOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT THE OPPORTUNITIES AND WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL CONNECTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT RACE GROUPS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

FIGURE 29: Frequency of interracial interaction, SARB 2019¹²⁷



Other than the category, 'Nothing', the key barriers to more interaction as reported by South Africans are language barriers and confidence, as shown by Table 11. For about one in ten (7.2%), negative prior experiences are the foremost reason for not interacting with people from other race groups.

Table 11: Barriers to interracial interaction, SARB 2019¹²⁸

	First	Second
Nothing	34.3	13.7
Language	18.1	14.2
Your confidence	10.9	13.4
No common ground	8.5	9.1
Negative prior experiences	7.2	11.5
Your willingness to talk/engage	6.2	11.8
Fear/anxiety	4.4	10.7


The spaces in which the greatest proportion of South Africans report that they experience racism are commercial spaces, with 15.6% of South Africans saying they often or always experience racism in these spaces. This is followed by work/study spaces, with 15.1% of South Africans often or always experiencing racism in these spaces, and then public recreational spaces, with 14.6% of South Africans always or often experiencing racism in such spaces. Almost half (49%) of the South African population reports never experiencing racism on public transport, although the extent of interracial interaction in these spaces should be taken into account.

127 The question reads: 'Thinking about a typical day in the past month, how often do you think you interacted or talked to someone who was of a different race to you? a) At work/place of study, b) At home, c) In commercial or retail spaces, d) At social gatherings and events, e) In public spaces (such as parks, stadiums and benches), and f) At public transport spaces (such as trains, buses, taxis or airports).' Response categories include: 'Never', 'Rarely', 'Sometimes', 'Often' and 'Always'. 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis.

128 The question reads: 'In general, what may prevent you from talking to people of different race groups?' Statements are as listed in Table 11.

INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND RELATIONS CONTINUED

FIGURE 30: Frequency of experiences of racism, SARB 2019¹²⁹



Composite scales, with scores from 1 to 5, were constructed using the question items relating to interracial interaction and racism experiences. Higher scores indicate more interracial interaction for the interracial interaction scale, while higher scores indicate more experiences of racism for the racism experience scale. The mean score of 3 for reported interracial interaction between Indian/Asian respondents and other groups is the highest for all the categories, while the comparative score of 2.3 for black African respondents is the lowest. In terms of experiences of racism, the mean score for black African respondents indicates a greater extent of experiences of racism reported among respondents in this group in comparison with other historically defined race groups.

Table 12: Mean scores – interracial interaction and racism experience scales, SARB 2019¹³⁰

	Interracial interaction scale	Racism experience scale
Black	2.3	2.2
White	2.7	2.0
Indian/Asian	3.0	2.1
Coloured	2.7	2.0
South Africa	2.4	2.1

The SARB also investigates whether South Africans approve or disapprove of integration in various settings. The first question asked is which race group – other than their own – a respondent finds it difficult to associate with. Four in ten (41.2%) South Africans indicated that they did not have difficulties with any group. Those who identified a group were then asked questions about integration with that group in various spaces. More than six in ten (62.6%) of these respondents indicated that they approved of receiving medical care in an emergency from a doctor from the group they had identified as finding difficulty in associating with – this met with the most approval of all the statements asked. At the other end, the integration statement that was met with the most disapproval pertains to a close relative marrying a person from the group of respondents identified, with 22.9% of respondents disapproving of integration in this regard. The latter is an important indicator when measuring integration. The incidence of intergroup marriage is considered a measure of the dissolution of social and cultural barriers and therefore of social and cultural integration. Despite coming from different backgrounds, partners in intergroup (for the


129 The question reads: 'How often does racism affect your daily life in these various places?' Spaces are as listed in Figure 30. Response categories include: 'Always', 'Often', 'Sometimes', 'Rarely' and 'Never'. 'Don't know' responses were not included in the data analysis.

130 **Interracial interaction:** This scale measures how frequently the respondent on a typical day in the past month interacted or talked with people of other races in various public and private spaces. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating more frequent interracial interaction, and vice versa.

Racism daily: This scale measures how frequently the respondent experiences racism in their daily life in various public and private spaces. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating more frequently experienced daily racism, and vice versa.

purposes of this report, interracial) marriages are likely to share some common values and aspirations. These elements are seen to be enabling of social cohesion in multicultural societies.¹³¹ Although the choice of spouse should be one's own, the SARB questions aims to gauge family member perceptions of interracial unions, to ascertain whether attitudes cultivated during colonialism and apartheid still prevail. This is of particular relevance, as the banning of interracial relationships was introduced by the apartheid government and was part of its overall policy of separateness.¹³²


FIGURE 31: Approval of racial integration, SARB 2019¹³³



Xenophobia

Given the limited trust reported in people from other countries living in South Africa, as well as the many reported xenophobic incidents that took place in South Africa during 2019, the SARB investigated xenophobic attitudes among South Africans.

FIGURE 32: Likelihood of preventing people from other African countries accessing services and activities, SARB 2019¹³⁴



131 Khoo, S. 2011. Integration and multiculturalism: A demographic perspective, Chapter 6. In M. Clyne and J. Jupp (eds). *Multiculturalism and integration: A harmonious relationship*. Canberra: ANU.

132 South African History Online (SAHO). 2016. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act commences. Available online: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/prohibition-mixed-marriages-act-commence>.

133 The question reads: 'Think of... (the race group mentioned in the previous question) and tell me in the case of each of the following statements whether you would strongly approve, approve, neither disapprove nor approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of any of the following things?' The statements are as per Figure 31. Response options are: 'Not applicable' (rendered as 'Missing'); 'Strongly disapprove' and 'Disapprove' (combined to form 'Disapprove'); 'Strongly approve' and 'Approve' (combined to form 'Approve'); and 'Neither disapprove nor approve' as the middle option.

134 The question reads: 'Please can you tell me how likely you are to prevent people who have come here from other African countries from...'. Statements are as per Figure 32. Response options are as per Figure 32.

INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND RELATIONS CONTINUED

Four in ten (39%) South Africans reported that they were likely to prevent people from other African countries from moving into their neighbourhood, and from operating a business in their area (38%). Furthermore, just over a third reported that they were likely to prevent people from other African countries from accessing government services (34%), and from accessing jobs (36%).

A composite scale was constructed from the above question items – with scores from 1 to 5 showing some interesting insights. Higher scores indicate a greater extent of xenophobic sentiment. The mean scores for lower SEM groups is lower than for higher groups, showing a lesser extent of xenophobic beliefs among those in lower SEM groups in comparison with those in higher SEM groups. Younger age groups also have higher SEM scores, showing greater reported xenophobic beliefs among younger age groups in comparison with older groups, and the mean scores for those with secondary education, post-secondary education, and some university and postgraduate degree are higher than for other education groups – showing greater reported xenophobic beliefs among these educated groups. The lowest mean score of all education groups is for those with no schooling, showing less xenophobic beliefs among this group. These findings counter myths that poor people and those with limited formal education, are mostly xenophobic, showing that xenophobic sentiments are pervasive – and often more so – among educated and wealthier South Africans.

Table 13: Mean scores – xenophobic attitudes, SARB 2019¹³⁵

	Mean score
SEM 1-4	2.92
SEM 5-7	3.06
SEM 8-10	3.08
18-24 years	3.13
25-34 years	3.03
35-49 years	2.97
50-59 years	2.95
60+	2.89
No schooling	1.14
Some primary school	2.86
Primary school completed (Grade 7/Standard 5)	2.71
Some high school/secondary school	2.90
Secondary school/high school completed (Matric/Grade 12/Standard 10)	3.06
Post-secondary qualifications, other than university, e.g. a diploma or certificate	3.08
Some university	3.29
University degree completed	2.92
Postgraduate degree completed	3.21
South Africa	3.00

¹³⁵ This scale measures the degree of prejudice towards non-nationals in terms of taking action to prevent them from accessing services and jobs, and residing in or operating a business in the respondent's neighbourhood. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of xenophobia, and vice versa.

IN TERMS OF RACIAL RECONCILIATION, MOST SOUTH AFRICANS REPORT THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO INTERACT MORE OFTEN WITH PEOPLE FROM OTHER RACE GROUPS. THE PREDOMINANT BARRIERS TO INTERACTION MENTIONED (OTHER THAN 'NONE') ARE LANGUAGE AND CONFIDENCE BARRIERS, WHILE SOME MENTIONED NEGATIVE PRIOR EXPERIENCES.

In summary

The 2019 SARB shows greater bonding trust than bridging trust among South Africans, with, in particular, low levels of trust in people from other countries living in South Africa. Xenophobic sentiments are also pervasive, with roughly four in ten South Africans agreeing that they are likely to prevent people from other African countries from accessing certain services and from engaging in certain activities. Debunking myths regarding xenophobic attitudes primarily being present among poor people and those with limited formal education, further investigation of the SARB's data shows a greater extent of xenophobic sentiment among educated groups in comparison with groups with limited formal education, and a greater extent of xenophobic attitudes among higher SEM groups in comparison with lower SEM groups. In addition, younger age groups also show a greater extent of xenophobic beliefs in comparison with older age groups.

In terms of racial reconciliation, most South Africans report that they would like to interact more often with people from other race groups. The predominant barriers to interaction mentioned (other than 'None') are language and confidence barriers, while some mentioned negative prior experiences. The spaces in which the greatest proportion of South Africans report interacting with people from other race groups are work or study places, while the space in which the greatest proportion of South Africans never have interaction with people from other race groups is in their homes. The historically defined race group with the greatest extent of reported experience of racism is Black African respondents, while this group also reports the least interracial interaction in comparison with other race groups. South Africans approve of integration to various degrees, with less than half of South Africans approving of interracial marriage – a key indicator of integration in diverse societies.



VIOLENCE, SAFETY AND RECONCILIATION

9

The 2019 South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) survey findings highlight the importance of addressing violence through various means as part of the reconciliation process. Some of these ways are evident from South Africans' responses: Firstly, with peace (i.e. 'the reduction of violence and the establishment of peace') ranking as the term the second-most respondents associate with reconciliation; secondly, with 72% of South Africans agreeing that reconciliation is impossible as long as gender-based violence continues in our society; and, thirdly, with 36.6% of South Africans stating that their personal safety worsened since 1994. Feeling safe or unsafe may relate to fear of crime and/or violence, and may also relate to socio-economic dynamics. Perceptions of safety impact our daily interactions, may dictate our movements, determine who we choose to engage with, and inform our actions. Perceptions of safety thus intersect with identity and space, and, in turn, with societal goals such as social-cohesion processes.¹³⁶

South Africa's governmental institutions acknowledge the importance of safety, with Outcome 3 of the South African National Development Plan (NDP) 2030, launched in 2012, envisioning a South Africa where all people are and feel safe. The outcome states that its aim is for 'people living in South Africa [to] feel safe at home, at school and at work, and [to] enjoy a community life free of fear. Women [will] walk freely in the street and children [will] play safely outside.' The NDP furthermore outlines the constraints to achieving such a society:

[U]nacceptably high levels of crime, especially serious and violent crime, result in people in South Africa, especially vulnerable groups such as women, children, older persons and people with disabilities, living in fear and feeling unsafe. It also impacts negatively on the country's economic development and undermines the wellbeing of people in the country and hinders their ability to achieve their potential...'¹³⁷

The SARB posits that unjust/unequal power relations between different social groups (e.g. race/class) hinder progress towards reconciliation. More just and equitable power relations would create a more fertile environment for reconciliation. The SARB measures perceptions related to this by asking about access to economic, social, cultural and spatial resources within society. Certain sub-indicators are used, each of which demonstrates differential perceptions of access to realms of power in society – including perceptions of safety in various private and public spaces. Knowing who feels unsafe, and where, can help us in understanding how perceptions of safety intersect with identity and space, and, in turn, with societal goals such as social-cohesion processes.


136 Potgieter, E. and Du Plooy, E. 2019. Safety and perceptions of safety. IJR Reconciliation and Development Series, Occasional Paper No. 5. Available online: <https://www.ijr.org.za/portfolio-items/safety-and-perceptions-of-safety/>.

137 National Development Plan (NDP). 2012. Available online: <https://www.gov.za/issues/outcomes-approach>.

INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND RELATIONS CONTINUED

Figure 33 shows that more than six in ten South Africans report feeling safe at home and at places of work or study (64% and 61%, respectively), with slightly less South Africans feeling safe in commercial spaces (59%) and in their neighbourhoods (57%). Around half of the South African population reports feeling safe on public transport and in public recreational spaces (50% and 49%, respectively). Perceptions that we are safe or unsafe in certain spaces rather than others may impact social mobility – for example should someone feel unsafe in using public transport (as half of the adult South African population does), but does not have other options available such as a private car or lift club, it could deter someone from accessing transportation entirely, thus limiting their work and personal-goal pursuits. At the other end, that more South Africans report that they feel safe at home, at work and in commercial spaces than is the case in their neighbourhoods, on public transport or in public recreational spaces, raises the question whether these former spaces appear safer because (private) security measures were, or can be, taken to secure these spaces.

FIGURE 33: Perceptions of (un)safety in various spaces, SARB 2019¹³⁸



A composite scale was constructed using all of the above question items, with scores 1 to 5, with higher scores showing greater perceived safety. Table 14 shows that female respondents reported greater perceptions of unsafety than male respondents. The mean score for historically defined black African and Coloured respondents is the same as the South African score (2.7), while the mean score for white respondents (2.6) and Indian/Asian respondents (2.3) shows greater perceptions of unsafety than the South African score. The mean score for Indian/Asian respondents is the lowest of all the mean scores listed – possibly given that this group is both a technical and sociological minority. The mean score for South Africans between 50 and 59 years of age (2.6) also shows greater perceptions of unsafety than the national mean score. The mean scores for SEM groups 5–7 and SEM groups 8–10 also show greater perceptions of unsafety than for SEM groups 1–4. Notably, the mean score for metro respondents (2.5) is lower than that for non-metro respondents – showing greater perceptions of unsafety among South Africans living in metro areas in comparison with those who live in non-metro areas.

¹³⁸ The question reads: 'How safe do you feel in the following places?' Places are as per Figure 33. Response options include: 'Very Safe' and 'Safe' (combined to form 'Safe' in Figure 33), and 'Unsafe' and 'Very Unsafe' (combined to form 'Unsafe' in Figure 33). 'Don't know' responses were included in the data analysis.

Table 14: Means – safety perceptions, SARB 2019 ¹³⁹	
	Mean
South Africa	2.7
Male	2.7
Female	2.6
Black	2.7
White	2.6
Indian/Asian	2.3
Coloured	2.7
18–24 years	2.7
25–34 years	2.7
35–49 years	2.7
50–59 years	2.6
60+	2.8
SEM 1–4	2.8
SEM 5–7	2.6
SEM 8–10	2.6
Metro	2.5
Non-metro	2.9

In summary

Safety and violence present challenges to South Africa. Crime levels in South Africa frequently rank as among the highest in the world, especially in terms of violent crimes (such as murder and rape). This is coupled with institutional challenges to counter such activities, such as resource handicaps at the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). Crime and violence also carry costs for the already flat South African economy. It is, however, not only the economy and institutions that are impacted. Crime, coupled with limited capacity to prosecute perpetrators, has implications for citizens and their lived and perceived levels of safety – affecting the fibre of South African society. Feeling safe or unsafe may also relate to socio-economic and power dynamics in society – impacting both reconciliation and social-cohesion processes. It is thus not surprising that many South Africans associated reconciliation with peace as the absence of violence, and that most South Africans agree that reconciliation is impossible as long as gender-based violence persists in our society. Given the impact of safety perceptions on social-cohesion and reconciliation processes, it is helpful to understand who feels unsafe or safe, and where. Only half of the adult population reports feeling safe on public transport and in public recreational spaces. Less South Africans feel safe in their neighbourhood than they feel safe in commercial spaces or at work – possibly given that other/private security measures can be/have been put in place in these spaces. More South Africans feel safe at home than in any other place – although more than a third still feel unsafe in their homes. Considering all these question items together through a personal safety scale, those who feel less or more safe in general can be identified. The most notable findings in this regard include the following: non-metro South Africans in general feel safer than those living in metro areas (which are also where more crimes are reported), female South Africans feel more unsafe than male South Africans, and, in terms of historically defined race groups, Indian/Asian respondents feel more unsafe than any other group – possibly due to being both a technical and sociological minority.

139 This scale measures the degree of personal safety of the respondents in their homes and various public spaces such as retail, recreational and transportation spaces. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of personal safety, and vice versa.

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

SARB publications and data availability

Findings from previous South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) rounds were released as part of reports, briefing papers, working papers, occasional papers and other publications of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR). More information on sampling, methodology and findings are presented as part of these publications, and are available on the IJR's website: www.ijr.org.za. All data from 2003 to 2017 have also been made available on the IJR's website in the form of an online analysis tool. Data from the 2003 to 2013 rounds were furthermore used as part of a book published by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the IJR, namely *Rethinking reconciliation: Evidence from South Africa* (edited by Lefko-Everett, Govender and Foster, 2017). The book is available at: <https://www.hsrcpress.ac.za/books/rethinking-reconciliation>. More information on the SARB's methodology, measurement of reconciliation, and findings over time are captured as part of this book, as well as on the IJR's website.

Conceptualisation

Table i: SA Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses and indicators, 2003–2013

Hypotheses	Indicators
Human security: If citizens do not feel threatened, they are more likely to be reconciled with each other and the larger system.	Physical security; economic security; cultural security
Political culture: ⁴⁰ If citizens view the institutions, leadership and culture of the new system as legitimate and accountable, reconciliation is more likely to progress.	Justifiability of extra-legal action; legitimacy of leadership; legitimacy of Parliament; respect for the rule of law
Cross-cutting political relationships: If citizens are able to form working political relationships that cross divisions, reconciliation is more likely to advance.	Commitment to national unity; commitment to multiracial political parties
Historical confrontation: If citizens are able to confront and address issues from the past, they are more likely to be able to move forward and be reconciled.	Acknowledgement of the injustice of apartheid; forgiveness; reduced levels of vengeance
Race relations: If citizens of different races hold fewer negative perceptions of each other, they are more likely to form workable relationships that will advance reconciliation.	Interracial contact; interracial preconceptions; interracial tolerance
Dialogue: If citizens are committed to deep dialogue, reconciliation is more likely to be advanced.	Commitment to more dialogue
ONLY 2003 ROUND – Commitment to socio-economic development: If citizens are able to commit themselves to transformation and redress, the national reconciliation process is more likely to progress.	Willingness to compromise

Table ii: SA Reconciliation Barometer hypotheses and indicators, 2015 onwards

Hypotheses	Indicators
Power relations: Unjust/unequal power relations between different social groups (e.g. race/class) hinders progress towards reconciliation. More just and equitable power relations would create a more fertile environment for reconciliation. Limited to perceptual data, we have chosen to measure this by asking about access to economic, social, cultural and spatial resources within society. This concept is measured through these sub-indicators, each of which demonstrates differential perceptions of access to realms of power in society.	Economic access; social access; cultural access; spatial access
Democratic political culture: Reconciliation is more likely to thrive in a society where there is a growing democratic political culture. This is evident when citizens feel part of an inclusive nation, participate in the political process, feel the government is legitimately elected, respect the rule of law, and support democratic political institutions.	Political community; political efficacy; the rule of law; confidence in democratic institutions
Apartheid legacy: In order for reconciliation to take root in South Africa, it is necessary, firstly, to acknowledge and deal with the legacy of direct, structural and symbolic violence and oppression suffered under apartheid, and, secondly, to support initiatives aimed at the redress of this legacy.	Acknowledging the injustice of apartheid; acknowledging the legacy of apartheid; support for redress and transformation
Racial reconciliation: Progress towards reconciliation cannot take place without the opportunities and willingness to engage in meaningful connection between different race groups in South Africa.	Willingness to walk in someone else's shoes; willingness to tolerate; willingness to confront racism; formal opportunities to engage; spontaneous opportunities to engage
Improvement in reconciliation: For reconciliation to advance, South Africans should feel connected to the concept (i.e. they can understand and articulate the meaning of reconciliation) and have experienced it in their own lives. Reconciliation is a complex concept with different meanings. This indicator attempts to ascertain the subjective meaning of reconciliation held by respondents, and, according to their subjective meaning, then to measure perceptions of improvement.	Meaning of reconciliation; perceived improvement in reconciliation
Perceptions of change: For reconciliation to advance, it is important for citizens to perceive positive change within society with regard to the past and the future.	Material change; psychological change; hope for the future

Table iii: Realised sample vs. weighted sample, SARB 2019		
Variable	Realised sample n = 2 400	Weighted sample n = 39 079 734
Race groups		
Black	62%	78%
White	15%	10%
Coloured	16%	9%
Indian	7%	3%
Sex/gender		
Male	42%	48%
Female	58%	52%
Area specification		
Metro	58%	45%
Non-metro	42%	55%
Age groups		
18 to 24 years old	14%	17%
25 to 34 years old	25%	28%
35 to 49 years old	36%	29%
50 to 59 years old	15%	12%
60+ years old	11%	14%
Provinces		
Eastern Cape	14%	11%
Free State	9%	5%
Gauteng	22%	28%
KwaZulu-Natal	18%	18%
Limpopo	6%	9%
Mpumalanga	5%	7%
North West	5%	7%
Northern Cape	3%	2%
Western Cape	18%	13%

APPENDIX B: INSIGHTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH IJR EXPERTS

Dominique Dryding, *Project Leader: Afrobarometer*

"[In terms of the findings regarding a greater proportion of South Africans feeling safe in their home, workplaces and commercial spaces], when we look at how those spaces are securitised and protected, many people have some form of control over the level of protection [in these spaces]. Spaces like workplaces and commercial spaces are communal spaces with lots of people around, and there might be security in place – which might be an explanation for why [a greater proportion of] people feel safe in those environments. Yes, it's people's perceptions of safety, [but] perceptions often shape how we respond to our lived environment. [For example,] you might be working as a construction worker and you legitimately fear physical safety [at work] versus somebody feeling unsafe at work because of sexual harassment."

"The frequency with which we see high-profile cases not taken forward ... what perception does that give to the country about whether crime is acceptable or not?"

"How much can you trust the system to protect you, if you can't access those means of protection?" [with reference to police and legal support to victims of sexual and/or domestic violence]

"[In terms of the importance of addressing gender-based violence to help facilitate reconciliation processes] in a meaningful way, we have to make sure that women especially feel safe to navigate public spaces to engage in – in discussions at home, or at work, [they need to feel that] they aren't going to be abused, lambasted or violated. How do we expect over half of the population to function optimally if their minds are always concerned with being safe? In terms of moving forward as a society, and to be able to utilise the full potential of every human being – to do what they are capable of and do, what they're able to do in a meaningful way – [feeling safe] is such an important thing that we need to get to in order for reconciliation to be realised.

Not to say that women do not function optimally but rather recognising that constantly thinking about safety and where you are able to move without fear takes time and energy which could be used doing something else."

[Anonymous] *IJR staff member*

"Radio is cheap, but you've got a lot of options – community radio, commercial radio etc. I think it's a good thing that people still use radio, because it reaches everywhere. I don't know of any part of this country that doesn't get radio signal. The potential for geography is great. When it comes to SABC radio and TV, they also broadcast in different languages. They reach people, as people are more comfortable listening or watching what is on SABC [given the language options and reach]."

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"As soon as you hide things, you make people forget ... That flag tells the story of this country in its own way. It is how you interpret it, because we can't pretend we didn't live under that flag and the rules that it came with ... [Also], the opinions still exist [associated with the flag] and the people who have these ideas belong to the country as well – you cannot push them away and say they must go ... People need to be free to express what they think. Otherwise, what you're doing is you're making people feel alienated from the future of the country. Because people have opinions [for example xenophobic sentiments], terrible opinions, but we need to know about them, rather than it going underground. I'd rather know, than to pretend that it's not bad. However, it shouldn't incite violence – that is the line."

Gugu Nonjenge, *Project Leader: Afrobarometer*

"Corruption undermines the integrity and effectiveness of South Africa's institutions. It affects government's ability to deliver services to citizens, and thus have a direct impact on the lives of the citizens. It's very difficult for citizens to focus on social cohesion, when there's a scarcity of public services. [Public-sector] corruption furthermore does not exist in a vacuum. We should be reminded of private-sector corruption and money laundering that also divert resources away from public services. When government is engaged in corruption, ordinary citizens suffer the most. This impacts social cohesion and reconciliation processes, as everything links to social justice. If you can't get to a point where everyone gets equal access to resources – in economic terms or in social terms – we can't begin to speak about reconciliation."

Eleanor du Plooy, *Senior Project Leader: Sustained Dialogues*

"... this opens up a conversation and it offers an opportunity for us as South Africans to really delve into that, and to talk about it [GBV]. I think that it is encouraging that a majority of South Africans acknowledge that GBV limits reconciliation, because in the face of everything that's been happening over the past couple of months – all the GBV – that it's not just women that are engaged or feel affected by it. This moment shows that South Africans acknowledge that GBV is an issue. It also opens up a conversation about the intersection of identities, and the impact and meaning of these identities on people's lives."

"These findings (Figure 2) show that South Africans acknowledge that in other parts of their lives (in addition to race relations) the presence of conflict between different groups or different sentiments. As the conversation around reconciliation opens up to include race relations, social and economic justice, addressing GBV, corruption, political divisions, xenophobia etc., it offers us an opportunity to start thinking differently about conflict and reconciliation 25 years into democracy."

Stanley Henkeman, *Executive Director IJR*

"One must read these findings in light of recent events preceding the [survey] interviews. In spite of the dominance of corruption and the increased representation for right- and left-wing political parties in the recent elections, we still have positive findings. These findings reflect people's aspirations; aspirations to be South African, and for their children to be South African. [These findings] are like a vote of confidence in the potential of South Africa. These aspirations show hope."

"Government really needs to think about how we celebrate our national days. People clearly want to identify with this country, but national day celebrations are often nothing more than political rallies. The concept of unity gets eroded by the fact that you often have different parties at competing celebrations of the same national day. We have to ask how we can carry these positive sentiments [regarding unity and South African identity] to aspects of national identities and how we celebrate national days. How do we create a space for people to celebrate their heritage, for example? Heritage Day celebrations have to be inclusive, and people should feel represented in some way or another. That is where I think government can do much more. It is these things that will help to foster a sense of belonging, a sense of well-being among South Africans."

Felicity Harrison, Head of Department: Sustained Dialogues

"Trust is absolutely essential. And that is actually what is missing in most of the conversations that we have. You can invite people to a dialogue and whether they pitch up may have to do with interest in the topic, but a lot of that has to do with whether they trust the space, whether they trust that the space will hold them, whether they trust that the space will be a safe space, and whether they trust other people enough to be vulnerable in that space."

"We are not going to have to see any behavioural change until the stereotypes are broken down. And the only way to break down stereotypes is to have conversations with people so that you've got more than just one narrative. So that you've got different points of view and insight into what what's going on. It takes a bit of a risk for somebody to initiate a conversation, but to have conversations in spaces that are not threatening can actually help us to expand our viewpoints. It's a start; you have to start somewhere to start in a place where you've got some form of commonality."

"Human rights education is something that is still completely lacking. When we look at the proportion of people who would want to stop foreigners accessing healthcare or business opportunities within communities, it shows a complete disjunction between our human rights, what we say in terms of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, and the practice on the ground. We come from a country where human rights have never been respected, and we can't expect 25 years of democracy to miraculously change 400 years of colonialism and apartheid. But, by the same token, I don't think that that civil society or government is doing enough to ensure that people have an understanding of human rights, human rights as part of common humanity, and what we have by virtue of the fact just being a human being. And I think that that affects social cohesion ..."

Lucretia Arendse, Project Leader: Sustained Dialogues

"It is in personal relationships, and in challenging our biased and discriminatory thinking, that we can really overcome racial divisions. It is important to find existing common ground, and then find space to really talk about the things that divide, and how we can together transform that. There are little moments that people can interact, but it's also about having conversations and actions that extend beyond those moments of interaction. It is also important to be reminded of each other's human dignity, so that we can listen to understand, and to place ourselves in another person's shoes – to think how something would make them feel."

"Leadership is of importance in all spheres. Leaders need to be mindful about how they speak about people – whether it be in terms of race relations, or gender etc. To me, that is one of the fundamental things, as we are all leaders in some regard. It is a tough job for leaders, because they have to be the custodians of human dignity in a way."

[Anonymous] IJR staff member

"The findings regarding more subjective aspects of social mobility – namely self-confidence and self-determination – are fairly positive. It shows that South Africans feel that they do have personal agency, despite the reported more limited access to resources [such as finance, education, mobility and social capital]. The finding that many South Africans feel adequately equipped for the future [in terms of educational access] seems to be an over-estimation [from more objective measures], both in terms of qualifications and the changing labour market where many will have to grapple with the influence of automation on job security. Furthermore, mobility and social capital are both important resources that may impact social cohesion. Mobility, because it may impact whether people have access to spaces where they might interact with people from other groups. And social capital, that can – depending on its nature (inclusive or exclusive) play a role in building trust and interaction."

"[With reference to the findings about perceived change in society since 1994], I often wonder what the baseline is people refer to when answering these questions, and my hunch is that their response is a proxy for how they currently feel. In the broader public's mind, the apartheid years prior to 1994 are generally regarded as the yardstick for poor governance. To say that some aspects of society have worsened since 1994 is therefore quite

ANNEXURE B CONTINUED

an indictment ... I wonder what influences people's perceptions regarding inequality in this instance. I would ascribe it to their current experiences, as well as the realisation that they are part of a system. Inequality in the South African context has a historical legacy component, as well as a (global) systemic economic component."

"[With reference to the sentiments regarding corruption and inequality limiting progress with reconciliation], we have to keep in mind that respondents might refer to both public and private corruption. Our politics largely operate as a patronage system, with "insiders" and "outsiders". I would think the sentiment that reconciliation is impossible as corruption continues is linked to the sentiment that reconciliation is impossible as long as those who were disadvantaged under apartheid continue to be poor. Poverty is influenced by poor governance and corruption and also have a historical component to it."

NOTES

[illegible]

NOTES

[illegible]

The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) is an independent, non-governmental organisation, which was established in 2000 in the wake of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) with the aim of ensuring that the lessons of South Africa's successful transition to democracy remain fundamental principles central to government and society as the country moves forward. Today, the IJR works to build fair, democratic and inclusive societies across Africa after conflict.

The South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) is a public opinion survey conducted by the IJR. Since its launch in 2003, the SARB has provided a nationally representative measure of citizens' attitudes to national reconciliation, social cohesion, transformation and democratic governance. The SARB is the only survey dedicated to critical measurement of reconciliation in South Africa, and is the largest longitudinal data source of its kind globally. As one of the few dedicated social surveys on reconciliation in Africa and worldwide, the SARB has become an important resource for encouraging national debate, informing decision-makers, developing policy and provoking new analysis and theory on reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

For more information, visit the IJR website at www.ijr.org.za.

